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THE LIGHT OF NATURE: JOHN LOCKE,
NATURAL RIGHTS, AND THE ORIGINS OF
AMERICAN RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
STEVEN J. HEYMAN*
This Article explores John Locke’s theory of religious liberty, which deeply
influenced the adoption of the First Amendment and the first state bills of rights.
Locke sharply criticized the religious and political order of Restoration
England—a regime in which the king claimed to hold absolute power by divine
right and in which individuals were required by law to conform to the
established church.
In opposition to this regime, Locke developed a powerful theory of human
beings as rational creatures who were entitled to think for themselves, to direct
their own actions, and to pursue their own happiness within the bounds of the
law of nature. He then used this view to give a new account of political and
religious life. To promote their happiness in this world, rational individuals
would agree to give up some of their natural freedom and to enter into a civil
society for the protection of their natural rights or “civil interests” of life,
liberty, and property. By contrast, Locke argued that, when they made the
social contract, rational individuals would not surrender any of their religious
freedom, for they could reasonably hope to attain eternal happiness or
salvation only if they used their minds to seek the truth about God and the path
he desired them to follow. For Locke, the most basic precepts of religion could
be known by the light of nature and reason, while others were matters of faith.
Locke’s conception of human beings as rational creatures provided the
basis not only for individual rights but also for duties toward others. Reason
required one to recognize that other individuals were entitled to the same rights
one claimed for oneself. It followed that all members of society were obligated
* Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Tech. A.B. 1979, J.D. 1984, Harvard. For
thoughts on this Article, I am grateful to Kate Baldwin, Mark Rosen, Christopher Schmidt, Steven D.
Smith, and participants in a Chicago-Kent Early Stage Workshop and a panel at the annual meeting of
the Association for the Study of Law, Culture, and the Humanities that was held at Georgetown
University Law Center in March 2018. I also wish to thank Stephanie Flowers and Katlyn DeBoer for
their valuable research assistance.
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to respect both the religious freedom and the civil rights of those who differed
with them in matters of religion.
In addition to defending religious freedom, Locke advocated a strict
separation of church and state. Because liberty of conscience was an
inalienable right, individuals would not grant the state any authority over
spiritual matters. Instead, those matters were reserved for the individuals
themselves as well as for the religious societies or churches that they
voluntarily formed to promote their salvation.
In these ways, Locke sought not only to protect the inherent rights of
individuals but also to dissolve the dangerous unity between church and state
that characterized the Restoration. At the same time, he sought to transform
the nature of those institutions in a profound way: instead of being rooted in
any notion of a hierarchy ordained by God or nature, both church and state
should be founded on the consent of free and equal individuals and should
respect their nature as rational beings. Understood in this way, religion would
be an ally rather than a threat to human liberty. After exploring Locke’s theory,
this Article sketches some of the ways that it contributed to the eighteenthcentury American view of religious liberty that was embodied in the First
Amendment.
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[No power to compel Religion can] be vested in the Magistrate by
the Consent of the People; because no man can so far abandon the care of his
own Salvation, as blindly to leave it to the choice of any other, whether Prince
or Subject, to prescribe to him what Faith or Worship he shall embrace. For
no Man can, if he would, conform his Faith to the Dictates, of another. All the
Life and Power of true Religion consists in the inward and full perswasion of
the mind: And Faith is not Faith without believing.
— John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration1
I.

INTRODUCTION

On the eve of the American Revolution, the representatives of the people
of Virginia issued a Declaration of Rights.2 The document began by
1. JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION (William Popple trans., 2d ed. 1690), in
JOHN LOCKE: A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION AND OTHER WRITINGS 1, 13 (Mark Goldie ed.,
Liberty
Fund
2010)
[hereinafter
LOCKE,
LETTER
CONCERNING
TOLERATION],
http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/locke-a-letter-concerning-toleration-and-other-writings
[https://perma.cc/7PUV-UDJ9].
2. VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS OF 1776, reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, Bill
of Rights, doc. 2, at 3 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987) [hereinafter VA. DECLARATION
OF
RIGHTS],
http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/bill_of_rightss2.html
[https://perma.cc/44P8-J77U].
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proclaiming “[t]hat all men are by nature equally free and independent, and
have certain inherent rights” that they do not give up when they enter society,
including life, liberty, property, and the pursuit of “happiness and safety.”3
After setting forth a number of other rights, the Declaration culminated with the
assertion
[t]hat Religion, or the duty which we owe to our Creator, and
the manner of discharging it, can be directed only by reason
and conviction, not by force or violence; and, therefore, all men
are equally entitled to the free exercise of religion, according
to the dictates of conscience; and that it is the mutual duty of
all to practise Christian forbearance, love, and charity, towards
each other.4
Other state bills of rights also treated the free exercise of religion as a natural
and inalienable right.5 The same view animated the efforts of Thomas Jefferson
and James Madison to defend religious liberty in Virginia during the decade
following Independence, as well as the movement to protect that freedom in the
First Amendment to the United States Constitution.6
The American conception of religious liberty had important roots in the
thought of the seventeenth-century English philosopher John Locke.7 In A
Letter Concerning Toleration, Locke mounted a powerful case for the liberty
of conscience and the separation of church and state.8 The views that he
3. Id. art. 1, at 3.
4. Id. art. 16, at 3–4. As originally drafted by George Mason, this article provided “that all men
should enjoy the fullest toleration in the exercise of religion.” LANCE BANNING, THE SACRED FIRE
OF LIBERTY: JAMES MADISON AND THE FOUNDING OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC 85 (1995) (quoting
Mason’s draft) (emphasis added). The stronger language¾that “[a]ll men are equally entitled to enjoy
the free exercise of religion”¾was formulated by James Madison. Id. at 85, 86 (quoting Madison’s
amendment) (emphasis added).
5. See, e.g., PA. CONST. OF 1776, DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. II, in 5 THE FOUNDERS’
CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, Bill of Rights, doc. 5, at 6, http://presspubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/bill_of_rightss5.html [https://perma.cc/C8U6-YLP3]; MASS.
CONST. OF 1780, pt. 1, art. II, in 5 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, Bill of Rights, doc.
6,
at
7,
http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/bill_of_rightss6.html
[https://perma.cc/MH7W-95S4].
6. See infra Part VII.
7. See NICHOLAS P. MILLER, THE RELIGIOUS ROOTS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 63–90 (2012);
JOHN WITTE, JR. & JOEL A. NICHOLS, RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT
29−33, 52−53 (3d ed. 2011); MICHAEL P. ZUCKERT, THE NATURAL RIGHTS REPUBLIC 20 (1994)
[hereinafter ZUCKERT, NATURAL RIGHTS REPUBLIC].
8. See LOCKE, LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 1. For some valuable works that
explore Locke’s views on religion and religious liberty, see RICHARD ASHCRAFT, REVOLUTIONARY
POLITICS & LOCKE’S TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (1986); JOHN MARSHALL, JOHN LOCKE,
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expressed deeply influenced the American approach to religious freedom, just
as his account of natural rights and the social contract in the Two Treatises of
Government9 played a key role in justifying the American Revolution and
laying the foundations for the new state and federal constitutions.10 Thus, an
exploration of Locke’s views on religious liberty will shed great light on the
way that Americans conceived of that freedom during the revolutionary and
founding periods.
As I shall show in this Article, Locke’s views on religious toleration are
best seen in the context of his broader theory of human freedom. To understand
that theory, it is helpful to begin with the historical context in which he wrote.
The restoration of the English monarchy in 1660 was soon followed by laws
that reestablished the Church of England and imposed severe penalties and
disabilities on Catholics and dissenting Protestants. In addition to defending
this regime of religious conformity and persecution, the Anglican clergy
increasingly advocated an absolutist view of royal power by preaching that the
king ruled by divine right. From Locke’s perspective, these developments in
church and state posed a stark danger of spiritual and political tyranny.
It was in response to this threat that Locke developed his theory of religious
and civil liberty. At the core of that theory was the idea that human beings were
rational creatures who had the capacity to think for themselves, to direct their
own actions, and to pursue their own happiness. As such, human beings were
inherently free and equal. To promote their well-being in this world, rational
individuals would agree to form a civil society and establish a government that
TOLERATION AND EARLY ENLIGHTENMENT CULTURE (2006) [hereinafter MARSHALL, EARLY
ENLIGHTENMENT]; JOHN MARSHALL, JOHN LOCKE: RESISTANCE, RELIGION, AND RESPONSIBILITY
(1994) [hereinafter MARSHALL, RESISTANCE ]; VICTOR NUOVO, CHRISTIANITY, ANTIQUITY, AND
ENLIGHTENMENT: INTERPRETATIONS OF LOCKE (2011); ALAN P.F. SELL, JOHN LOCKE AND THE
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY DIVINES (1997); RICHARD VERNON, THE CAREER OF TOLERATION: JOHN
LOCKE, JONAS PROAST, AND AFTER (1997); JEREMY WALDRON, GOD, LOCKE, AND EQUALITY:
CHRISTIAN FOUNDATIONS OF JOHN LOCKE’S POLITICAL THOUGHT (2002); JEREMY WALDRON,
Locke, Toleration, and the Rationality of Persecution, in LIBERAL RIGHTS 88 (1993); MICHAEL P.
ZUCKERT, LAUNCHING LIBERALISM: ON LOCKEAN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY (2002); Mark Goldie,
John Locke, Jonas Proast, and Religious Toleration 1688–1692, in THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND,
C.1689–C.1833, at 143 (John Walsh et al. eds., 1993) [hereinafter Goldie, Religious Toleration]; Ian
Harris, John Locke and Natural Law: Free Worship and Toleration, in NATURAL LAW AND
TOLERATION IN THE EARLY ENLIGHTENMENT 59 (John Parkin & Timothy Stanton eds., 2013);
Timothy Stanton, Natural Law, Nonconformity, and Toleration: Two Stages on Locke’s Way, in id. at
35.
9. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press
1988) (student ed., 1988) (3d printing 1698) [hereinafter LOCKE, GOVERNMENT].
10. See ZUCKERT, NATURAL RIGHTS REPUBLIC, supra note 7, at 20.
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was empowered to use force to protect their “Civil Interests” in life, liberty, and
property.11 In addition to providing a justification for the state, reason imposed
essential limits on government power.
While civil society was concerned with the temporal good of human beings,
religion was concerned with their eternal salvation and happiness in the world
to come. On Locke’s view, reason played a central role in this realm as well.
The basic principles of religion could be found in what he called “Natural
Religion,” that is, religion insofar as it was capable of being known by the “light
of Reason” or “the light of Nature.”12 In An Essay Concerning Human
Understanding, Locke argued that individuals were capable of using reason to
recognize that God existed and that they were dependent upon him. If they
hoped to attain salvation, they had to believe, worship, and act in ways that he
found acceptable. The actions that God required were contained in the law of
nature and reason, which established the duties that individuals owed to him, to
other people, and to themselves. Living a good life in accord with those duties
was the best worship of God. There were limits to natural religion, for the
particular forms of worship and belief that God desired could be ascertained
only through divine revelation, which was a matter of faith. However, while
faith could teach things that were above reason, it could not teach anything that
was contrary to reason, for that would conflict with the rational nature that God
had bestowed on human beings.
This view of the relationship between religion, faith, and reason provided
the basis for Locke’s defense of religious freedom. As rational creatures,
individuals could hope to attain salvation only if they used their minds to seek
the truth about God and his will. Individuals could not be saved unless they
actually held the beliefs they professed. Thus, the freedom to form one’s own
beliefs and to worship in accord with them was an inalienable right which
rational individuals would not surrender when they entered civil society. By
the same token, reason dictated that one had a duty to recognize that other
individuals were also rational creatures who were entitled to the same freedom
11. LOCKE, LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 1, at 12.
12. JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING bk. III, ch. IX, § 23, at
490; id. bk. II, ch. XXVIII, § 8, at 352 (Peter H. Nidditch ed., Clarendon Press 1975) (4th ed. 1700)
[hereinafter LOCKE, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING]. As Locke explains in an early work, “when we say
that something is known by the light of nature, we would signify . . . the kind of truth whose knowledge
man can, by the right use of those faculties with which he is provided by nature, attain by himself and
without the help of another.” JOHN LOCKE, QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE LAW OF NATURE qu. II,
fol. 23, at 119 (Robert Horwitz et al. eds. & trans., Cornell Univ. Press 1990) [hereinafter LOCKE, LAW
OF NATURE ]. As the editors indicate, this work was composed in Latin “no later than 1664” and was
first published, with an English translation, in 1954. Id. at 29–30.
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of worship and belief that one claimed for oneself. Under the law of nature, all
individuals were obligated to respect the religious liberty and the civil rights of
those who differed with them in matters of religion, and indeed to treat them
with charity and goodwill. In addition, because Locke held that the law of
nature had the same content as the moral law that was revealed by God in the
Bible, this duty was also a precept of the Christian religion.
In addition to endorsing religious liberty, Locke advocated a strict
separation of church and state. Because liberty of conscience was inalienable,
individuals would not grant civil society any authority whatever over religious
matters. It followed that civil government should be devoted exclusively to
civil interests, while spiritual matters were reserved for individuals themselves
and for the religious societies or churches that they formed in their efforts to
attain salvation.
In these ways, Locke sought not only to protect the inherent rights of
individuals but also to dissolve the dangerous unity between church and state
that characterized the Restoration. At the same time, he sought to transform the
nature of those institutions in a profound way: instead of being rooted in any
notion of a hierarchy ordained by God or nature, both church and the state
should be based on the voluntary consent of free and equal individuals and
should respect their nature as rational creatures. Understood in this way,
religion would be an ally rather than a threat to human liberty.
In short, Locke invoked the idea that human beings were rational creatures
to overturn the traditional conception of religion and politics. Although it is
well known that this idea was important for Locke, scholars have rarely
undertaken to thoroughly explore the central role that it plays in his political
and religious thought. By focusing on the concept here, I hope to make a
distinctive contribution to the literature on Locke as well as to develop a better
understanding of the philosophical and theological origins of the American
approach to religious liberty.
This Article proceeds in six Parts. Part II describes the Restoration
religious and political order that is the background to Locke’s position. I then
turn to the theory of civil and religious freedom that he developed in opposition
to this regime. In Part III, I outline his conception of human beings as rational
creatures who were capable of self-determination and show how it informed his
account of their intellectual and practical activity. I then explore the ways that
Locke used this conception to develop a more libertarian theory of politics and
religion. Part IV considers his view of the political community as “a Society
of Rational Creatures” who had united for the protection of their civil
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interests,13 while Part V addresses his account of religious societies or churches
as free and voluntary associations that individuals form to promote their
salvation. Part V also discusses his understanding of faith and reason as well
as the crucial part that it played in his defense of religious freedom. Part VI
explains how Locke sought to reform the dominant religion of his time by
placing reason at the center of Christian theology. Part VII concludes with a
brief discussion of Locke’s legacy for the American view of religious liberty
during the revolutionary and founding eras.
II. THE RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL ORDER OF RESTORATION ENGLAND
A. The Effort to Impose Religious Uniformity
Locke was born in Somerset, England, in 1632.14 As he later observed, “I
no sooner perceived myself in the world but I found myself in a storm.”15 In
1642, the increasingly bitter conflict between King Charles I and his Parliament
erupted into a Civil War.16 The struggle stemmed in part from the fear that
Charles was seeking to become an absolute ruler.17 At the same time, the
dispute was a religious one, pitting the king’s Anglican supporters against his
Puritan opponents.18 The parliamentary forces prevailed.19 In 1649, Charles
was tried, convicted, and executed as a tyrant and a traitor to the people of
England, and the nation was declared to be a Commonwealth.20 In less than a
decade, however, the new regime began to collapse, and in 1660 the late king’s
son returned from exile to become King Charles II.21
At first, it appeared that the restoration of the monarchy might bring a
considerable measure of reconciliation between the opposing groups. In 1660,
Charles II issued The Declaration of Breda, which promised “a liberty to tender
consciences.”22 But the new king’s Anglican supporters were in a less forgiving
13. LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra note 9, bk. II, § 163, at 376–77.
14. See ROGER WOOLHOUSE, LOCKE: A BIOGRAPHY 1 (2007).
15. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TRACTS ON GOVERNMENT tract I, at 119 (Philip Abrams ed. & trans.,
Cambridge Univ. Press, 1967) [hereinafter LOCKE, TWO TRACTS] (originally drafted in 1660–62).
16. WOOLHOUSE, supra note 14, at 8.
17. See id.
18. See id. at 8–9; JOHN COFFEY, PERSECUTION AND TOLERATION IN PROTESTANT ENGLAND,
1558–1689, at 135–43 (2000).
19. See ROGER LOCKYER, TUDOR AND STUART BRITAIN, 1471–1714, at 285–86 (1964).
20. See id. at 292–93.
21. See id. at 305–06.
22. THE DECLARATION OF BREDA (1660), reprinted in THE CONSTITUTIONAL DOCUMENTS OF
THE PURITAN REVOLUTION 466 (Samuel Rawson Gardiner ed., 1906).
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mood. With “bitter memories” of the persecution that they themselves had
suffered under the Commonwealth, the Anglicans who dominated the new
Parliament took a hardline position on religious matters.23 In 1662, they passed
the Act of Uniformity, which reestablished the Church of England as the
national church.24 Declaring that a lack of religious discipline had produced
the “Factions and Schismes” that had led to the Civil War, Parliament moved
to reimpose a uniform form of worship on the nation.25 All clergy members
had to be ordained by Anglican bishops and had to affirm, and conduct services
in accord with, the Book of Common Prayer.26 All preachers, lecturers, and
college heads were required to subscribe to the Thirty-Nine Articles of
Religion, the Anglican statement of the faith that had been adopted a century
earlier.27 This effort to compel Anglican conformity resulted in more than two
thousand “Puritan clergy—including a third of the London ministers¾[being]
forced out” of their positions, including “around 200 lecturers, college fellows,
and schoolmasters.”28 Other Restoration-era legislation excluded religious
dissenters from holding civil or military office;29 banned Quaker meetings and
all other public services that did not use the Anglican liturgy;30 and imposed
severe restrictions on dissenting clergy and preachers.31
During the same year that it adopted the Act of Uniformity, Parliament also
resolved to reinstate censorship of the press. The new Licensing Act began by
denouncing “the general licentiousnes” of the Commonwealth period, which
had allowed “many evil disposed persons” to publish subversive works¾a
practice that they continued to engage in “to the high dishonour of Almighty
God[,] the endangering the peace of these Kingdomes[,] and raising a
disaffection to His most Excellent Majesty and His Government.”32 To combat
23. COFFEY, supra note 18, at 167.
24. Charles II, 1662: An Act for the Uniformity of Public Prayers, 13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 4 (1662)
(Eng.), in 5 STATUTES OF THE REALM 1628–80, at 364–70 (John Raithby ed., 1819),
http://www.british-history.ac.uk/statutes-realm/vol5/pp364-370 [https://perma.cc/4AVU-ZL9Q].
25. Id. preamble.
26. Id. §§ 1–5, 9.
27. Id. §§ 13, 15; The Church of England, Articles of Religion (1562), in THE BOOK OF COMMON
PRAYER (1662) [hereinafter THIRTY-NINE ARTICLES].
28. COFFEY, supra note 18, at 168 (citation omitted).
29. Id. at 168, 172 (describing Corporation Act of 1661 and Test Acts of 1673 and 1678).
30. Id. at 168–69 (recounting Quaker Act of 1662 and Conventicles Acts of 1664 and 1670).
31. Id. (discussing Second Conventicles Act and Five Miles Act of 1665).
32. An Act for Preventing the Frequent Abuses in Printing Seditious Treasonable and
Unlicensed Books and Pamphlets and for Regulating Printing and Printing Presses, 14 Car. 2, c. 33
(1662) (Eng.), reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, amend. I, doc. 1, at 112,
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this evil, the Act banned the publication of all “heretical seditious schismatical
or offensive Bookes or Pamphlets wherein any Doctrine or Opinion shall be
asserted . . . which is contrary to Christian Faith or the Doctrine or Discipline
of the Church of England,” or which leveled any scandalous attack against the
church, the state, their leaders, or private persons.33 To effectuate this
prohibition, the Act made it unlawful to print any book or pamphlet without
first receiving a license from one of the censors to be appointed under the
statute.34
As the historian John Coffey has observed, the Restoration-era laws that
attempted to suppress religious dissent¾laws that are collectively known as the
Clarendon Code¾resulted in a persecution that was unparalleled in
seventeenth-century Protestant Europe: “Dissenters were arrested, prosecuted
and imprisoned in their thousands. Hundreds of meetings were violently
broken up, and Dissenters were harassed by organised gangs and angry
mobs. . . . Dissenters also had to pay fines which were heavy and sometimes
crippling.”35 Hundreds of Quakers were banished or chose to emigrate to the
American colonies.36 Although the laws that prescribed the death penalty for
heresy and blasphemy largely fell into disuse, and were abolished by statute in
1678, many dissenters died as a result of the harsh conditions they endured in
prison.37
In persecuting nonconformity, hardline Anglicans were motivated not only
by a desire for revenge but also by a fear of how they themselves might be
treated if the dissenters should return to power in the future.38 At the same time,
the Anglican approach rested on political and theological beliefs that were
widely accepted in post-Reformation Europe.39 These beliefs held that the
people of a nation made up “a single Christian community.”40 Every member
of the commonwealth belonged to the national church and vice versa.41 On this
http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/amendI_speechs1.html [https://perma.cc/3KHMTVZ9].
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. COFFEY, supra note 18, at 170.
36. Id. at 177–78.
37. See id. at 170, 173-76, 179.
38. Id. at 167, 173, 180.
39. See PETER MARSHALL, THE REFORMATION: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 132–34 (2009)
[hereinafter MARSHALL, REFORMATION ].
40. Id. at 113.
41. For a classic articulation of this view, see RICHARD HOOKER, OF THE LAWS OF
ECCLESIASTICAL POLITY bk. VIII, ch. 1 (Arthur Stephen McGrade ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1989)
(1648). As one Anglican writer put it, ancient Christian doctrine dictated that “[t]here must be but one
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view, church and state were simply two aspects of the same society, a society
that had both spiritual and temporal concerns.42 With regard to spiritual
matters, the church and the state were obligated to work together to promote
true religion and the salvation of souls.43
Within this broad view there could be different accounts of the relationship
between church and state. During the 1660s and early 1670s, many Anglicans
articulated an Erastian position which emphasized the power of the civil ruler
or “magistrate” to impose uniformity in external forms of worship in order to
prevent religious dissension and maintain civil peace.44 As the Restoration
wore on, however, many Anglicans moved toward an Augustinian or High
Church position, which stressed the primacy of the established church in
religious matters.45 On this view, the magistrate was bound to use his coercive
power to uphold the teaching authority of the clergy and to punish individuals
who refused to accept their views of Christian doctrine and worship.46 In its
strongest form, this High Church position held that episcopacy, or the rule of
bishops, was not simply one possible form of church government but instead
was a matter of divine right (jure divino)—an institution that Christ himself
established when he founded the church.47
In either its Erastian or its High Church form, the Reformation view
embraced several justifications for the use of state power to suppress religious
nonconformity when it took the form of offenses such as heresy (maintaining
beliefs contrary to Christian orthodoxy) or schism (causing a separation within
the body of the church).48 First, by bringing dissenters to true religion and
eternal salvation, the state coerced them for their own good.49 Second, heresy
Church, in one place.” WILLIAM SHERLOCK, A RESOLUTION OF SOME CASES OF CONSCIENCE WHICH
RESPECT CHURCH-COMMUNION 20 (London, Fincham Gardiner, 2d ed. 1683),
https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015063594355 [https://perma.cc/3AX6-RQBY].
42. See HOOKER, supra note 41, bk. VIII, ch. 1; MARSHALL, REFORMATION, supra note 39, at
113.
43. See Mark Goldie, The Theory of Religious Intolerance in Restoration England, in FROM
PERSECUTION TO TOLERATION 331, 334 (Ole Peter Grell et al. eds., 1991) [hereinafter Goldie,
Religious Intolerance].
44. See id. at 332–33. Interestingly, Locke himself endorsed this position in the early 1660s,
before he came to support religious toleration. See LOCKE, TWO TRACTS, supra note 15, tract I, at
120.
45. Goldie, Religious Intolerance, supra note 43, at 332–37, 358, 365, 367–68.
46. See id. at 332–37, 365, 367.
47. See Mark Goldie, John Locke and Anglican Royalism, 31 POL. STUD. 61, 77–79 (1983)
[hereinafter Goldie, Anglican Royalism].
48. See COFFEY, supra note 18, at 25, 28 (distinguishing between heresy and schism).
49. See id. at 34–35.

HEYMAN - MULR VOL. 101, NO. 3 (PDF).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

716

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

5/4/18 4:02 PM

[101:705

and schism were grave sins which deserved to be punished.50 Third, heretics
poisoned the minds of others and led them on a path to perdition, while schism
injured the body of the church itself.51 Finally, because church and state were
inseparably connected, an attack on the established religion also amounted to
sedition or an attack on royal authority—an argument that had particularly
strong resonance for Anglicans when they recalled the Puritan revolution
against Charles I, and when they perceived renewed efforts to rebel against his
son during the Restoration.52
B. The Divine Rights of Kings
For all these reasons, much of the Anglican clergy strongly supported the
Clarendon Code’s effort to suppress religious dissent.53 At the same time, they
also increasingly espoused the view that the monarch’s power, like that of the
bishops, was jure divino.54 In that regard, they relied on works like Sir Robert
Filmer’s Patriarcha, which was written to refute the idea that human beings
were naturally free and equal and thus were “at liberty to choose what form of
government [they] please.”55 Drawing on a highly contestable interpretation of
the Old Testament as well as on an authoritarian conception of the law of nature,
Filmer maintained that no one was naturally free, for all were born in
“subjection to their parents.”56 When the first man, Adam, was created by God,
he came to have “royal authority over [his] children” by a natural “right of
fatherhood.”57 In this way he attained a “lordship . . . over the whole
world, . . . [that] was as large and ample as the absolutest dominion of any
monarch which hath been since the creation,” with the “power of life and death”
over his offspring.58 Adam’s sovereignty was inherited by his descendants,
including the biblical patriarchs.59 For Filmer, this “natural authority of a
supreme father” was the foundation of the power of all rulers in the world.60
50. See MARSHALL, EARLY ENLIGHTENMENT, supra note 8, at 450-53.
51. See id. at 450–53; COFFEY, supra note 38, at 36.
52. See COFFEY, supra note 18, at 38–41; MARSHALL, EARLY ENLIGHTENMENT, supra note 8,
at 440–49.
53. See COFFEY, supra note 18, at 26–27; Goldie, Anglican Royalism, supra note 47, at 75–76,
80.
54. See Goldie, Anglican Royalism, supra note 47, at 64–71.
55. ROBERT FILMER, PATRIARCHA (1680), reprinted in PATRIARCHA AND OTHER WRITINGS 1,
§ 1, at 2–3 (Johann P. Sommerville ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991).
56. Id. § 3, at 7.
57. Id. § 3, at 6.
58. Id. § 4, at 7.
59. Id. § 3, at 6–7.
60. Id. § 10, at 11.
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Drawing on Filmer and other writers, the Anglican clergy contended that the
king possessed unlimited power by divine right and that subjects were obliged
to render him absolute obedience.61
C. Locke’s Critique of the Restoration Regime
In these ways, hardline Anglican religious and political leaders defended a
regime in which conformity to the established church was mandated by law and
the king claimed to rule by divine right. Much of Locke’s life and work was
devoted to attacking this conception of the social order. In the First Treatise of
Government, he demolished Filmer’s position that all political power was
derived from the sovereignty of Adam.62 To begin with, Locke argued, Filmer
had failed to demonstrate that either Scripture or the law of nature gave Adam
absolute power over his children or “Dominion over the World.”63 Even if
Adam had possessed such authority, it could not have descended to his heirs.64
And in any event, since the knowledge of who those heirs were had been
“utterly lost” long ago, there was absolutely no way to determine who was
entitled to exercise such power now.65
On these grounds, Locke concluded that the Anglican argument for
absolutism was unfounded. On the contrary, as he wrote in the Second Treatise,
“Absolute Monarchy, which by some Men is counted the only Government in
the World, . . . can be no Form of Civil Government at all,” for it is
incompatible with the very purpose of civil society, which is to ensure that the
rights of all individuals are protected under the law.66 However much
protection those rights might find against other private individuals under an
absolute monarchy, they would receive no protection against the monarch
himself.67 Indeed, by exposing individuals to the unlimited power of the ruler,
61. See Goldie, Anglican Royalism, supra note 47, at 64–71. As the University of Oxford
expressed this doctrine in its condemnation of Whig political theory, individuals must “submit[] . . . ,
for the Lord’s sake, . . . to the king as supreme,” and “this submission and obedience is to be cleare,
absolute, and without exception of any state or order of men[.]” The Judgement and Decree of the
University of Oxford, Passed in their Convocation Against Certain Pernicious Books and Damnable
Doctrines, Destructive to [the] Sacred Persons of Princes, Their State and Government, and of All
Human Society (1683), reprinted in 4 THE MANUSCRIPTS OF LORD KENYON 163, 165 (1894),
http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/4140f842-73be-41c4-ba55-56c21d4401f2
[https://perma.cc/9C3W-PZE4].
62. See LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra note 9, bk. I.
63. Id. bk. II, § 1, at 267 (summarizing argument of the First Treatise).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. See id. bk. II, § 90, at 326; id. bk. II, § 94, at 329.
67. Id. bk. II, §§ 91–93, at 326–28.
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an absolute monarchy would be even worse than a condition of anarchy in
which everyone had to fend for himself.68
Locke was equally unsparing in his criticism of the Restoration religious
order. In A Letter Concerning Toleration, he wrote that “all Ecclesiastical men,
who boast themselves to be the Successors of the Apostles,” should follow the
apostles’ example by using only spiritual means “to promote the Salvation of
Souls.”69 When churchmen employ “the Sword, or other Instruments of Force,”
to coerce individuals in matters of conscience, it is plain that they are motivated
not by charity or goodwill but rather by an “insatiable desire of Dominion” over
others.70 In Locke’s view, “the unhappy Agreement that we see between the
Church and State” stemmed from a corrupt bargain or alliance between the two,
in which each used the other to increase its own power at the expense of the
people: the king used his coercive force to compel them to submit to the clergy’s
authority, while in return the clergy declared that he ruled by divine right.71
Under this arrangement, Locke asserted, the clergy became “more Ministers of
the Government, than Ministers of the Gospel; and . . . they endeavour[ed] with
all their might to promote that Tyranny in the Commonwealth, which otherwise
they should not be able to establish in the Church[.]”72
III. MAN AS A RATIONAL CREATURE
The theory that Locke developed was intended to liberate individuals from
these forms of domination. At the core of that theory was the notion that human
beings were rational creatures. Of course, this idea did not originate with Locke
but instead had a long history in Western thought. Aristotle asserted that man
was the only animal with speech or reason (logos) and that the good for human

68. See id. bk. II, § 91, at 326–27; id. bk. II, § 137, at 359–60.
69. LOCKE, LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 1, at 61–62; accord id. at 11, 18–
19. The Letter was published in Latin in April 1689. See Mark Goldie, Notes on the Texts of LOCKE,
LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 1, at xxix–xxx. That fall saw the publication of an
English translation by Locke’s friend William Popple, which was made with Locke’s knowledge but
without his involvement. See id. at xxix. In this Article, I quote from the Popple translation, which is
the one that has been used in the English-speaking world from Locke’s day to our own. For a more
recent and literal translation, see JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION (Michael
Silverthorne trans. 2010) (1689), in LOCKE ON TOLERATION 3 (Richard Vernon ed., Cambridge Univ.
Press 2010).
70. LOCKE, LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 1, at 9–11, 60, 159–60.
71. Id. at 60–61. For an earlier statement of this point, see John Locke, Toleration A (c. 1675),
in LOCKE: POLITICAL ESSAYS 230, 234 (Mark Goldie ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1997).
72. LOCKE, LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 1, at 61.
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beings was “an activity of [the] soul in accord with reason.”73 The Scholastic
tradition, which synthesized Aristotelian philosophy and Christian theology,
characterized human beings not only as rational animals but also as “rational
creature[s]” who were created by God, and who were capable of using their
minds to discern the “natural law” which was an expression of the “Divine
Reason” by which the universe was governed.74 In his writings on religion,
politics, and other subjects, Locke drew on this traditional notion of a rational
creature but used it in a distinctive way to conceive of human beings as free,
equal, and independent individuals who had an inherent right to use their minds
to direct their own lives and to establish civil and religious institutions that were
based on consent. In this way, he developed a view that was sharply opposed
to the Restoration order and that provided key inspiration for the American
conception of religious and political freedom.
After exploring Locke’s basic concept of a rational creature, this Part shows
how it underlies his account of our intellectual and practical activity. The
following Parts then explain how he used this concept to transform traditional
conceptions of political and religious life.75
A. The Concept of a Rational Creature
Throughout his writings, Locke maintains that God has made man “a
Rational Creature.”76 This is the source of “the dignity and excellency” of
human nature.77 It is what allows free, self-determining individuals to pursue
their own good, to live in a condition of peace and justice with others, and to
seek a proper relationship with God.
As Locke makes clear, however, the concept of a rational creature is not
simply descriptive but also normative. Nature gives individuals the potential

73. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. 1, ch. 7, 1098a3-18, at 12–13 (Robert C. Bartlett &
Susan D. Collins trans., Univ. of Chicago Press 2011); see also ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS bk. I, ch. 2,
1253a8-9, at 37 (Carnes Lord trans., Univ. of Chicago Press 1984).
74. ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA pt. I, Q. 76, art. 3; pt. I–II, Q. 91, art. 1–2; pt.
I–II, Q. 94, art. 1 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., Benziger Bros., Inc. 1947),
http://dhspriory.org/thomas/summa/ [https://perma.cc/872U-WD82].
75. See infra Parts IV–V.
76. E.g., JOHN LOCKE, THE REASONABLENESS OF CHRISTIANITY AS DELIVERED IN THE
SCRIPTURES ch. II, at 13 (John C. Higgins-Biddle ed., Clarendon Press 1999) (1695) [hereinafter
LOCKE, REASONABLENESS OF CHRISTIANITY].
77. JOHN LOCKE, SOME THOUGHTS CONCERNING EDUCATION § 31 (1693), in SOME THOUGHTS
CONCERNING EDUCATION AND OF THE CONDUCT OF THE UNDERSTANDING 25 (Ruth W. Grant &
Nathan Tarcov eds., Hackett Publishing Co. 1996) [hereinafter LOCKE, EDUCATION].
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to live in accord with reason, but realizing this potential requires diligence and
effort.78
As Locke explains in Some Thoughts Concerning Education, this effort
begins with childrearing.79 Parents have an obligation to care for and educate
their children.80 The goal of education is to form them into rational creatures.81
Instead of imposing harsh discipline, parents should reason with their children
from an early age, for they “love to be treated as rational creatures sooner than
is imagined.”82 Education shapes the character of individuals by developing
their disposition to submit their will to reason and to follow its dictates on what
is best, even when those dictates run contrary to their own desires.83 The ability
to do this is “the great principle and foundation of all virtue and worth.”84
From an intellectual standpoint, the goal of education is not to give the
learner a perfect mastery of all (or indeed any) subjects but rather “to give his
mind that freedom, that disposition, and those habits that may enable him to
attain any part of knowledge he shall apply himself to, or stand in need of, in
the future.”85 Education seeks to cultivate our mental faculties, for “the right
improvement and exercise of our reason [is] the highest perfection that [we]
can attain to in this life.”86 Although this process begins in childhood, it is
something that should continue throughout our lives, as Locke stresses in one
of his final works, Of the Conduct of the Understanding.87
In the rest of this Part, I explore in greater depth what Locke means when
he says that human beings are rational creatures. I begin with the realm of
intellectual activity or the search for truth and then turn to practical activity or
the pursuit of happiness.

78. JOHN LOCKE, OF THE CONDUCT OF THE UNDERSTANDING §§ 1, 6 (1706), in SOME
THOUGHTS CONCERNING EDUCATION AND OF THE CONDUCT OF THE UNDERSTANDING 167, 178
(Ruth W. Grant & Nathan Tarcov eds., Hackett Publishing Co. 1996) [hereinafter LOCKE, CONDUCT].
79. See LOCKE, EDUCATION, supra note 77, § 1, at 10.
80. See LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra note 9, bk. II, § 58, at 306.
81. See LOCKE, EDUCATION, supra note 77, § 36, at 27.
82. Id. § 81, at 58.
83. Id. § 33, at 25.
84. Id. § 33, at 25; see also id. § 38, at 29; id § 45, at 32–33.
85. LOCKE, CONDUCT, supra note 78, § 12, at 187.
86. LOCKE, EDUCATION, supra note 77, § 122, at 95.
87. LOCKE, CONDUCT, supra note 78, § 1, at 167.
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B. Reason and the Search for Truth
Locke holds that, in the intellectual realm, individuals should not
unreflectively follow tradition, custom, or commonly held opinions.88 They
must not place “blind[], . . . implicit faith” in the views of others, such as their
“parents, neighbors, ministers,” “sect,” or “party.”89 Instead, as rational
creatures, individuals must take the “trouble of thinking and examining for
themselves.”90
In his Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Locke contends that when
we strip away the authority of tradition and convention, we are able to discern
the true sources of the knowledge that we have about ourselves and the world.91
He identifies these sources as intuition, sensation, and reason.92
It is through intuition that we have knowledge of our own existence.
Echoing René Descartes, Locke explains that when “I think [or] reason” or
when “I feel Pleasure and Pain,” I am necessarily aware that I exist.93 Indeed,
even “[i]f I doubt of all other Things, that very doubt makes me perceive my
own Existence, and will not suffer me to doubt of that.”94 In this way,
“Experience . . . convinces us, that we have an intuitive Knowledge of our own
Existence, and an internal infallible Perception that we are.”95
By contrast, the great majority of our beliefs are based on information that
we gain through our senses.96 Although I can possess knowledge of the
existence of some particular things, such as the paper I am writing on, most of
the beliefs that derive from sensation are matters of probability and opinion
rather than certainty and knowledge.97

88. See id. § 6, at 175.
89. Id. § 3, at 169; id. § 6, at 175; LOCKE, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 12, bk. I, ch.
IV, § 22, at 99.
90. LOCKE, CONDUCT, supra note 78, § 3, at 169.
91. See LOCKE, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 12, bk. I, ch. II, § 1, at 48.
92. See id. bk. IV, ch. IX, § 2, at 618.
93. Id. bk. IV, ch. IX, § 3, at 618. For a seminal discussion by Descartes, see RENÉ DESCARTES,
THE MEDITATIONS CONCERNING FIRST PHILOSOPHY (1641), in DISCOURSE ON METHOD AND
MEDITATIONS 59, 82 (Laurence J. LaFleur trans., Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1960).
94. LOCKE, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 12, bk. IV, ch. IX, § 3, at 618.
95. Id. bk. IV, ch. IX, § 3, at 618–19.
96. See id. bk. IV, ch. XI, § 1, at 630.
97. See id. bk. IV, ch. XI, §§ 2–3, 9, at 630–32, 635–36; id. bk. IV, chs. XV–XVI, at 654–68.
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It follows that in many areas our knowledge is quite limited.98 It is a mark
of wisdom not to insist on knowing things that we cannot know.99 That
insistence begins in intellectual arrogance and may end in “perfect Scepticism,”
when one comes to despair of the possibility of knowing anything at all.100
Locke maintains, however, that as rational creatures we have a duty to sincerely
“search after . . . [the] Truth” and the knowledge that we are capable of
attaining.101 This is especially true with regard to those matters that are of the
greatest concern to human beings.102
The most important of these matters relates to the existence of God.
According to Locke, we can have certain knowledge of God’s existence
through the use of reason, understood here in the sense of rigorous logical
demonstration. Presenting a version of the traditional cosmological argument,
Locke maintains that our existence ultimately can be traced to a first cause that
exists from eternity and that is the source of all the power, perception, and
knowledge that we find within ourselves as “knowing intelligent Being[s] [that
exist] in the World.”103 In this way, “from the Consideration of our selves, and
what we infallibly find in our own Constitutions, our Reason leads us to the
Knowledge of this certain and evident Truth, That there is an eternal, most
powerful, and most knowing Being,” which is what we call God.104 In other
passages, Locke offers a version of the traditional argument from design and
asserts that only an intelligent creator could have “produce[d] that order,
harmony, and beauty which is to be found in Nature.”105 In short, “the visible
marks of extraordinary Wisdom and Power, appear so plainly in all the Works

98. See, e.g., id. bk. IV, ch. III, at 538–62; id. bk. IV, ch. XIV, § 2, at 652; id. bk. IV, ch. XVI,
§ 4, at 660.
99. See id. bk. I, ch. I, §§ 4–7, at 44–47; id. bk. IV, ch. XI, § 10, at 636; id. bk. IV, ch. XII, § 12,
at 647.
100. Id. bk. I, ch. I, §§ 5–7, at 45–47.
101. Id. bk. III, ch. XI, § 3, at 509; accord id. bk. I, ch. I, § 6, at 46; id. bk. IV, ch. XII, § 11, at
646; id. bk. IV ch. XVII, § 24, at 688.
102. See, e.g., id. bk. I, ch. 1, §§ 5–6, at 45–46; id. bk. IV, ch. X, § 1 at 619; id. bk. IV, ch. XI,
§ 8, at 634; id. bk. IV, ch. XII, § 11, at 646; LOCKE, CONDUCT, supra note 78, § 8, at 182–83; id. § 23,
at 195; JOHN LOCKE, The Preface: An Essay for the Understanding of St. Paul’s Epistles, by Consulting
St. Paul Himself, in 1 A PARAPHRASE AND NOTES ON THE EPISTLES OF ST PAUL TO THE GALATIANS,
1 AND 2 CORINTHIANS, ROMANS, EPHESIANS 103, 115 (Arthur W. Wainwright ed., Clarendon Press
1987) (1707) [hereinafter LOCKE, ST. PAUL].
103. See LOCKE, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 12, bk. IV, ch. X, §§ 3–5, at 620.
104. Id. bk. IV, ch. X, § 6, at 621.
105. E.g., id. bk. IV, ch. X, § 10, at 624.
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of the Creation, that a rational Creature, who will but seriously reflect on them,
cannot miss the discovery of a Deity.”106
As we shall see, Locke’s conviction that human beings can know the
existence of God through reason plays a central role in his views on morality
and religion.107 Here, I wish to focus on the ethics of “the search of truth and
knowledge.”108
For Locke, this search should be characterized by intellectual freedom.
Individuals who think for themselves have little desire to impose their views on
others.109 As Locke puts it, “it is undoubtedly a wrong use of my understanding
to make it the rule and measure of another man’s; a use which it is neither fit
for nor capable of.”110 Locke therefore condemns those rulers, both civil and
ecclesiastical, who seek to “enslave[]” their subjects “in that which should be
the freest part of Man, their Understandings.”111 And by the same token, he
criticizes those who “lazily enslav[e] their [own] Minds, to the Dictates and
Dominion of others, in Doctrines, which it is their duty carefully to examine;
and not blindly, with an implicit faith, to swallow.”112
Instead, individuals have a duty to use their faculties to actively seek truth
and knowledge. In a powerful discussion that anticipates John Stuart Mill’s
position in On Liberty,113 Locke emphasizes the ways in which one’s opinions
are limited by one’s own perspective. One must impartially examine one’s
beliefs to ensure that they are not merely the product of tradition, custom, or
convention, or distorted by self-interest or prejudice.114 It is only when we
106. Id. bk. I, ch. IV, § 9, at 89. For Locke, this argument is strongly associated with St. Paul’s
Letter to the Romans, which asserts that God has made “his eternal power and Godhead” “clearly seen”
“by the things that [he] made” in creation. Romans 1:19-20 (King James). In his paraphrase of this
passage, Locke writes that “what is to be known of [God’s] invisible Being, [may] be clearly
discovered and understood in the visible beauty, order, and operations observable in the constitution
and parts of the universe by all those who would . . . apply their minds [in] that way.” LOCKE, ST.
PAUL, supra note 102, at 494 (footnote omitted); see also LOCKE, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra
note 12, bk. IV, ch. X, § 7, at 622 (relying on the same passage in Romans). In the Essay, Locke also
mentions the traditional ontological argument¾which seeks to prove God’s existence from the idea
that human beings have of God as a most perfect being¾but treats it as less conclusive than the
cosmological argument. See id. bk. IV, ch. X, § 7, at 621–22.
107. See infra text accompanying notes 221–33.
108. LOCKE, CONDUCT, supra note 78, § 10, at 184.
109. See LOCKE, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 12, bk. IV, ch. XVI, § 4, at 661.
110. LOCKE, CONDUCT, supra note 78, § 23, at 196.
111. LOCKE, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 12, bk. IV, ch. XX, § 4, at 708; accord id.
bk. I, ch. IV, § 22, at 99.
112. Id. bk. I, ch. IV, § 22, at 99.
113. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY ch. II (Prometheus Books 1986) (1859).
114. See LOCKE, CONDUCT, supra note 78, § 10, at 184; id. § 12, at 185.
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liberate ourselves from these constraints and seek the truth for its own sake that
we can attain “that freedom of the understanding which is necessary to a
rational creature, and without which it is not truly an understanding.”115
Like Mill, Locke also stresses the value of intellectual diversity. Even those
who make an effort to follow reason often go wrong because they are confined
within their own narrow intellectual worlds.116 To overcome this one-sidedness
and achieve a more comprehensive view, individuals should engage with other
fields of knowledge and with different sorts of people.117 They should entertain
objections to their own beliefs, participate in reasoned discussion, and engage
in “a free consideration of the several views and sentiments of thinking men of
all sides.”118 Above all, they should not mistreat those who disagree with them,
but instead strive “to maintain Peace, and the common Offices of Humanity,
and Friendship, in the diversity of Opinions.”119
C. Reason and the Pursuit of Happiness
Reason is also central to Locke’s account of practical activity. In contrast
to inanimate objects, humans are intelligent beings who have the power to use
their minds to direct their own actions.120 This power, which Locke calls the
will, is what makes them free agents.121
In an important chapter of the Essay, Locke explores the complex
relationship between freedom and the will. He argues that the will is
determined by desire¾specifically, by one’s desire for happiness.122 Locke
understands happiness in terms of pleasure and the absence of pain.123 He
makes clear, however, that there can be “pleasure and pain of the Mind, as well
as the Body.”124 Things are called “Good” insofar as they are apt to produce
pleasure in us and “Evil” insofar as they are apt to cause pain.125
In most cases, a person is not free to will or not to will; the will is ordinarily
determined by the most pressing desire. Yet this is liberty only in an equivocal

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id. § 12, at 186.
See id. § 3, at 169.
See, e.g., id. § 22, at 195.
Id. § 3, at 171.
LOCKE, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 12, bk. IV, ch. XVI, § 4, at 659.
See, e.g., id. bk. II, ch. XXI, §§ 7–9, at 237–38.
See id. bk. II, ch. XXI, §§ 8–9, at 237–38.
See id. bk. II, ch. XXI, § 41, at 258.
See id.
Id.
Id. bk. II, ch. XXI, § 42, at 259.
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sense, in which one is buffeted by “blind impulse[s]” like “a bubble by the force
of the wind.”126
Locke contends, however, that in many cases one has the power to suspend
the execution of one’s desires, to free oneself “from any necessary
determination of [one’s] will to any particular action,” until reason has an
opportunity to consider what course of action will promote one’s “real
happiness.”127 This is the foundation of human freedom, “the hinge on which
turns the liberty of intellectual Beings in their constant endeavours after . . . true
felicity.”128
At the same time, Locke points out that the determination of the will by
reason, and of reason by the good, involves not only freedom but also necessity
and obligation. Everyone, he says, “is put under a necessity by his constitution,
as an intelligent Being, to be determined in willing by his own Thought and
Judgment, what is best for him to do.”129 Yet Locke denies that this should be
viewed as an abridgment or restraint of liberty. Freedom involves selfdetermination; if the will were to be determined by anything other than an
individual’s own judgment, then “he would be under the determination of some
other than himself, which is want of Liberty.”130 Moreover, “the very end of
our Freedom” is to enable us to “attain the good that we chuse.”131
D. Reason and Natural Law
According to Locke, reason is not only capable of guiding individuals
toward their true happiness; it is also capable of deducing the principles of
morality that they are obligated to follow. Once again, this view is grounded
in a conception of humans as intelligent beings who were created by God. As
Locke puts it in the Essay:
The Idea of a supreme Being, infinite in Power, Goodness, and
Wisdom, whose Workmanship we are, and on whom we
depend; and the Idea of our selves, as understanding rational
Beings, being such as are clear in us, would, I suppose, if duly
considered, and pursued, afford such Foundations of our Duty
and Rules of Action, as might place Morality amongst the
Sciences capable of Demonstration: wherein I doubt not, but
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id. bk. II, ch. XXI, § 67, at 279.
Id. bk. II, ch. XXI, § 51, at 266.
Id. bk. II, ch. XXI, §§ 51–52, at 266–67.
Id. bk. II, ch. XXI, § 48, at 264.
Id.
Id.
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from self-evident Propositions, by necessary Consequences, as
incontestable as those in Mathematicks, the measures of right
and wrong might be made out, to any one that will apply
himself with the same Indifferency and Attention to the one, as
he does to the other of these Sciences.132
These principles of morality are what Locke calls “the Law of Nature and
Reason.”133 This law, which represents the will of God insofar as humans can
know it through natural reason, arises “from the Constitution of [their] very
Nature” as “Rational Creature[s].”134 The law of nature determines one’s duties
toward God, one’s neighbors, and oneself.135 In the following Parts, I explore
the central roles that these ideas of natural law and reason play in Locke’s
political and religious thought.
IV. REASON, THE LAW OF NATURE, AND THE POLITICAL COMMUNITY
Part III focused on Locke’s conception of the individual as a rational
creature. But while Locke regards humans as fundamentally individual beings,
he also holds that God “designed Man for a sociable Creature,” who both needs
and desires to live in “fellowship with those of his own kind” and who for this
purpose is endowed “with Understanding and Language.”136 The question that
arises is what it means for individuals to live together in “a Society of Rational
Creatures.”137
This is the central concern of Locke’s political philosophy as developed in
the Second Treatise of Government. The work’s immediate purpose is to justify
popular resistance to the efforts of Charles II and James II to become absolute
monarchs¾resistance that culminated in the Glorious Revolution of 1688–
1689, in which James was dethroned and replaced by William and Mary of
Orange.138 To make his case for resistance and revolution, Locke seeks to
132. Id. bk. IV, ch. III, § 18, at 549; see also John Locke, Knowledge B (1681), in LOCKE:
POLITICAL ESSAYS, supra note 71, at 281, 281–82 (asserting that “morality as well as mathematics [is]
capable of demonstration”).
133. LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra note 9, bk. II, § 96, at 332.
134. LOCKE, REASONABLENESS OF CHRISTIANITY, supra note 76, ch. XI, at 119; see also id. ch.
XV, at 169 (stating that God gave man “Reason, and with it a Law: That could not be otherwise than
what Reason should dictate; Unless we should think, that a reasonable Creature, should have an
unreasonable Law”).
135. See LOCKE, LAW OF NATURE, supra note 12, qu. V, fol. 59–61, at 167–69.
136. LOCKE, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 12, bk. III, ch. I, § 1, at 402; LOCKE,
GOVERNMENT, supra note 9, bk. II, § 77, at 318–19.
137. LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra note 9, bk. II, § 163, at 376.
138. See The Preface to id., at 137; id. bk. II, § 222, at 412; id. bk. II, § 225, at 415; id. bk. II,
§ 230, at 418. On the political background of the Two Treatises, see ASHCRAFT, supra note 8, at 17.
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determine the basic principles that apply to all legitimate governments. His
inquiry is a wide-ranging one, which draws on political observation,139
economic theory,140 historical speculation,141 anthropological discussion,142
biblical allusion,143 and classical learning.144 At its core, however, the Second
Treatise is an effort to understand “the True Original, Extent, and End of Civil
Government” by means of the same sort of rigorous logical analysis he
espouses in the Essay.145 In this way, Locke hopes to determine what would
motivate rational creatures to establish civil society and government; what
functions and powers they would assign to the government; what limitations
they would impose upon it; and what they are entitled to do if those limitations
are violated.
A. The State of Nature
1. Freedom and Equality
Locke begins his inquiry by “consider[ing] what State all Men are naturally
in.”146 This “State of Nature” is more logical than historical: it is the condition
that reason tells us human beings would be in before they made any positive
agreements with one another.147 According to Locke, this condition is “a State
of perfect Freedom,” in which individuals are entitled to control their own
persons, actions, and possessions “as they think fit, within the bounds of the
139. See, e.g., LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra note 9, bk. II, § 230, at 417–18; id. bk. II, §§ 223–
25, at 414–15 (contending that the people generally are reluctant to change the forms of government
to which they are accustomed, but that they inevitably resist oppression).
140. See id. bk. II, §§ 34–51, at 291–302 (articulating a labor theory of value and arguing that
the institution of private property and the invention of money promote economic well-being and
development).
141. See id. bk. II, § 105, at 336–37 (speculating that civil government commonly began with
the rule of the father of an extended family).
142. See, e.g., id. bk. II, § 41, at 296–97; id. bk. II, § 43, at 298; id. bk. II, § 46, at 299–300; id.
bk. II, § 65, at 310; id. bk. II, § 102, at 335; id. bk. II, § 105, at 337; id, bk. II, § 108, at 339–40
(discussing the social, economic, and political conditions of the native peoples of North and South
America).
143. See, e.g., id. bk. II, § 11, at 274 (alluding to the story of Cain and Abel in Genesis 4:1-16).
144. See, e.g., id. bk. II, § 102, at 334–35; id. bk. II, § 201, at 400; id. bk. II, § 237, at 423–24
(referring to the history of ancient Greece and Rome).
145. Title Page to id. bk. II, at 265; see supra text accompanying notes 132–35.
146. Id. bk. II, § 4, at 269. For the roots of Locke’s theory of the state of nature and the social
contract in the Scholastic tradition, see 2 QUENTIN SKINNER, THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN
POLITICAL THOUGHT 116–23, 154–66, 174–75 (1978); Goldie, Anglican Royalism, supra note 47, at
75.
147. LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra note 9, bk. II, § 4, at 269; see id. bk. II, § 6, at 270–71.
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Law of Nature.”148 In the language he uses elsewhere, these are the natural
rights to life, liberty, and property or “Estate.”149
According to Locke, the freedom of individuals “is grounded on [their]
having Reason,” which enables them to direct their actions for their own good
without encroaching upon the freedom of others.150 Because individuals are
free, they are also equal, with no one being naturally subordinate to, or having
a claim to “Dominion” over, anyone else.151
2. The Law of Nature
As Locke emphasizes, the natural freedom of individuals is not absolute or
arbitrary but is bounded by law. His discussion of this point deserves careful
examination, for it constitutes his clearest articulation of the principles of the
law of nature. As he explains, although the state of nature is
a State of Liberty, . . . it is not a State of Licence[:] though Man
in that State have an uncontroleable Liberty, to dispose of his
Person or Possessions, yet he has not Liberty to destroy
himself, or so much as any Creature in his Possession, but
where some nobler use, than its bare Preservation calls for it.
The State of Nature has a Law of Nature to govern it, which
obliges every one: And Reason, which is that Law, teaches all
Mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and
independent, no one ought to harm another in his Life, Health,
Liberty, or Possessions. For Men being all the Workmanship
of one Omnipotent, and infinitely wise Maker; All the Servants
of one Sovereign Master, sent into the World by his order, and
about his business, they are his Property, whose Workmanship
they are, made to last during his, not one anothers Pleasure.
And being furnished with like Faculties, sharing all in one
Community of Nature, there cannot be supposed any such
Subordination among us, that may Authorize us to destroy one
another, as if we were made for one anothers uses, as the
inferior ranks of Creatures are for ours. Every one as he
is bound to preserve himself, and not to quit his Station
willfully; so by the like reason when his own Preservation
comes not in competition, ought he, as much as he can, to
148. Id. bk. II, § 4, at 269.
149. Id. bk. II, § 87, at 323; id. bk. II, § 123, at 350.
150. Id. bk. II, § 63, at 309; accord id. bk. II, § 57, at 305–06; id. bk. II, § 59–61, at 307–09; see
supra text accompanying notes 120–31; infra text accompanying notes 152–53.
151. LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra note 9, bk. II, § 4, at 269.
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preserve the rest of Mankind, and may not unless it be to do
Justice on an Offender, take away, or impair the life, or what
tends to the Preservation of the Life, the Liberty, Health, Limb,
or Goods of another.152
Several vital points emerge from this passage. First, Locke identifies the
“Law of Nature” with “Reason.”153 Second, he deduces the obligations of this
law from our status as rational creatures¾beings who were created by God and
endowed with the same rational “Faculties,” and who thus are naturally free,
“equal and independent.”154 Third, the law of nature imposes duties not only
toward other individuals but also toward oneself and God. For instance, a
person who unjustifiably takes his own life commits a wrong against himself as
well as his “Maker,” whose “Property” and “Workmanship” he is.155 Finally,
the duties imposed by the law of nature are positive as well as negative in
character. Under that law, one is not merely forbidden to “harm” oneself or
others; one is also “bound to preserve” all human beings as far as one can.156
3. The Relationship Between Law and Freedom
Although the law of nature constrains the conduct of individuals, Locke
rejects the idea that law and freedom are antithetical. Instead, he insists that the
two are essential to, and inseparable from, one another. In another crucial
passage, he writes:
Law, in its true Notion, is not so much the Limitation as the
direction of a free and intelligent Agent to his proper Interest,
and prescribes no farther than is for the general Good of those
under that Law. Could they be happier without it, the Law, as
an useless thing would of it self vanish; and that ill deserves
the Name of Confinement which hedges us in only from Bogs
and Precipices. So that, however it may be mistaken, the end
of Law is not to abolish or restrain, but to preserve and enlarge
Freedom[.] For in all the states of created beings capable of
Laws, where there is no Law, there is no Freedom. For Liberty
is to be free from restraint and violence from others which
cannot be, where there is no Law: But Freedom is not, as we
are told, A Liberty for every Man to do what he lists: (For who
could be free, when every other Man’s Humour might
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Id. bk. II, § 6, at 270–71.
Id. at 271.
Id.
Id.
Id.

HEYMAN - MULR VOL. 101, NO. 3 (PDF).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

730

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

5/4/18 4:02 PM

[101:705

domineer over him?) But a Liberty to dispose, and order, as he
lists, his Person, Actions, Possessions, and his whole Property,
within the Allowance of those Laws under which he is; and
therein not to be subject to the arbitrary Will of another, but
freely follow his own.157
We can discern two distinct strands in this account of the relationship
between law and freedom. The first is that law directs free and rational beings
to their true interest. For example, the law of nature and reason forbids one to
unjustifiably kill oneself or to enslave oneself to another.158 Although there is
a sense in which these prohibitions restrict one’s freedom, in a deeper sense
they promote it: just as one does not wish to fall into “Bogs” or over
“Precipices,” so one does not truly want to engage in behavior that will injure
oneself or impair one’s ability to pursue one’s own happiness, which Locke
regards as the goal of all free action.159 This aspect of Locke’s argument echoes
his position in the Essay that one’s freedom of choice is not diminished when
one follows the course that reason indicates will promote one’s real
happiness.160
While the first strand of Locke’s argument focuses on the individual’s
pursuit of happiness, the second focuses on interaction between individuals.
Individuals cannot act freely if they are subject to violence from others. By
forbidding individuals to injure one another, the law not only secures their
freedom from violence but also enables all of them to pursue their own wellbeing.
In this way, Locke’s account of the relationship between law and freedom
combines two different ideas: (1) that law is consistent with freedom because it
directs “a free and intelligent Agent to his proper Interest,” and (2) that law is
consistent with freedom because it promotes “the general Good of [all] those
[who are] under that Law.”161 Although Locke presents these two ideas as
harmonious with one another, we can also discern some tension between them
157. Id. bk. II, § 57, at 305–06. The definition of natural liberty that Locke rejects here¾the
unrestricted ability to do what one likes¾is taken from Filmer. See id. bk. II, § 22, at 283–84 & n; id.
§ 57, at 306 & n; ROBERT FILMER, OBSERVATIONS UPON ARISTOTLES POLITIQUES (1652), in
PATRIARCHA AND OTHER WRITINGS, supra note 55, at 235, 268, 275. Thomas Hobbes takes a similar
approach. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN ch. XXI, at 145–48 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ.
Press 1991) (1651). For Filmer and Hobbes, liberty is opposed to law¾a position that they use to
support their authoritarian theories of government.
158. See LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra note 9, bk. II, § 6, at 271; id. bk. II, § 23, at 284.
159. Id. bk. II, § 57, at 305; see supra text accompanying notes 122–31.
160. See supra text accompanying notes 129–31.
161. LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra note 9, bk. II, § 57, at 305.
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in cases where an individual rationally might believe that his own interest
would be advanced by invading the rights of others. As we shall see in Part IV,
this problem turns out to be central to Locke’s account of religion, morality,
and the law of nature.162
4. The Relationship Between Law and Personality
Just as Locke sees an essential relationship between law and freedom, he
also holds that there is a basic connection between law and personality. In the
Essay, Locke uses the term person to describe a rational creature in its
relationship to the law. A person is “a thinking intelligent Being, that has reason
and reflection;” that is aware of its own identity over time; that is capable of
knowing the law that it is under, especially the law of nature; that “owns and
imputes to it self” the actions that it takes in relation to that law; and that is
accountable to itself and others for those actions—an accountability that may
take the form of rewards and punishments.163 In short, “Person . . . is a
Forensick Term appropriating Actions and their Merit [to an individual]; and
so belongs only to intelligent Agents capable of a Law, and Happiness and
Misery.”164
5. The Community of Nature
Now that we have explored the relationships between law, freedom, and
personality, let us return to Locke’s account of the state of nature. At times, he
characterizes this condition in highly individualistic terms.165 At other times,
however, he portrays it as having a communal dimension. For example, in the
passage on the law of nature that we considered earlier, Locke indicates that, as
members of a species who share the same “Faculties” and who are subject to
the same law, human beings belong to “one Community,” which he calls the
“Community of Nature.”166 Elaborating on this notion, he writes that, by giving

162. See infra text accompanying notes 249–54.
163. LOCKE, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 12, bk. II, ch. XXVII, § 9, at 335; id. bk. II,
ch. XXVII, § 26, at 346.
164. Id. bk. II, ch. XXVII, § 26, at 346.
165. See, e.g., LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra note 9, bk. II, § 123, at 350 (describing “Man in the
State of Nature” as “absolute Lord of his own Person and Possessions, equal to the greatest, and subject
to no Body”).
166. Id. bk. II, § 6, at 270–71; supra text accompanying note 152.
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reason and the law of nature “to be the Rule” and “common bond” between
human beings, God has “united [them] into one fellowship and societie.”167
On this view, while the state of nature is “a State of perfect Freedom,”168 it
is also a sort of social condition within which individuals interact in a positive
way. In Locke’s words, it is “a State of Peace, Good Will, Mutual Assistance,
and Preservation” in which individuals “liv[e] together according to reason.”169
6. Enforcing the Law of Nature
When he describes the state of nature in this way, Locke is viewing it from
a normative and logical perspective, as the condition that would obtain if
individuals actually lived in accord with their nature as rational creatures. In
reality, however, their conduct often falls short of this ideal. Instead, they are
often tempted to pursue their own interests by invading the rights of others.170
One who subjects others to “injury and violence” not only violates their rights
but also commits “a trespass against the whole Species” by transgressing the
law of nature and reason, “which is that measure God has set to the actions of
Men, for their mutual security.”171
But how can the law of nature be made effective in this situation? Because
there is no government in a state of nature, Locke argues that this law can be
enforced only by the individuals themselves.172 As rational creatures,
individuals are entitled to preserve themselves by judging and defending their
own rights.173 They also have a right to act for the preservation of mankind by
restraining and punishing those who violate the law of nature.174 And while
human beings generally have a right to be free from violence, Locke holds that
when offenders violate “the right Rule of Reason,” they degrade themselves
below the level of rational creatures and may properly be punished in
proportion to their crimes.175
As Locke recognizes, however, the defects of this regime are obvious.
First, “though the Law of Nature be plain and intelligible to all rational
167. LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra note 9, bk. II, §§ 171–72, at 381–83; see also id. bk. II, § 128,
at 352 (stating that under “the Law of Nature, . . . all . . . of Mankind are one Community, [and] make
up one Society, distinct from all other Creatures”).
168. Id. bk. II, § 4, at 269.
169. Id. bk. II, § 19, at 280.
170. See id. bk. II, § 123, at 350.
171. Id. bk. II, §§ 8, 10 at 272–73.
172. See id. bk. II, §§ 7–13, at 271–76.
173. See id. bk. II, §§ 16–19, at 278–81; id. bk. II, § 91, at 327; id. bk. II, § 128, at 352.
174. See id. bk. II, §§ 7–8, at 271–72; id. bk. II, § 12, at 274–75.
175. Id. bk. II, §§ 10–12, at 273–75; id. bk. II, § 8, at 272.
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Creatures,” it is not the sort of clearly defined and established rule that could
effectively constrain those who are inclined to violate it out of ignorance or
self-interest.176 Second, in a state of nature there is no impartial judge to resolve
disputes under this law.177 And finally, individuals may lack sufficient power
to enforce this law and bring offenders to justice.178 In short, while the rights
of individuals in a state of nature are extensive in theory, in practice those rights
would be extremely precarious.179
B. The Social Contract and the Political Community
Locke holds that, in view of these problems, rational individuals would
choose to leave the state of nature.180 Using the capacities for “Understanding
and Language” that God gave them for this purpose, they would make a social
contract and form a civil society “for the mutual Preservation of their Lives,
Liberties and Estates.”181
Thus, on Locke’s view, the polity is “a Society of Rational Creatures, entred
into a Community for their mutual good.”182 This conception lies at the heart
of his political theory. It enables him to identify the locus of political authority,
the role that reason plays in its exercise, the ends and limits of that authority,
and the remedies that are available when those limits are exceeded.
In the state of nature, every individual has the power to determine when his
rights are being violated and to defend them by force, as well as the power to
punish offenses against himself and others.183 When individuals enter civil
society, they transfer these powers to the community.184 It follows that all
political authority originally belongs to people as a whole.185
To be sure, this does not mean that the polity must be a pure democracy.
While the community may choose to retain the supreme kind of political
authority—the power of making laws—for itself, it may also choose to delegate
this authority to “a few select Men” (in which case the government is “an
Oligarchy”) or to an individual (in which case it is “a Monarchy”), or to
176. Id. bk. II, § 124, at 351.
177. See id. bk. II, § 125, at 351.
178. See id. bk. II, § 126, at 351.
179. See id. bk. II, § 123, at 350.
180. See id. bk. II, § 123, at 350; id. bk. II, § 127, at 352; id. bk. II, § 131, at 353.
181. Id. bk. II, § 77, at 318–19; id. bk. II, § 123, at 350.
182. Id. bk. II, § 163, at 376.
183. See id. bk. II, § 7, at 271–72; id. bk. II, § 87, at 323–24; id. bk. II, § 91, at 327; id. bk. II,
§ 128, at 352.
184. See id. bk. II, §§ 87–89, at 323–25; id. bk. II, §§ 128–30, at 352–53.
185. See id. bk. II, §§ 95–99, at 330–33; id. bk. II, § 132, at 354.
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establish some “mixed Form[] of Government.”186 On Locke’s view, however,
the people have good reason to entrust at least part of the lawmaking power to
a body of elected representatives.187 Moreover, he holds that taxes may be
imposed only with the consent of such a body or of the people themselves.188
Above all, his theory is meant to demonstrate that all legitimate governments
derive their power not from divine right but from the consent of the people.189
Locke’s conception of the political community as “a Society of Rational
Creatures” also highlights the essential role that reason should play in civil
government.190 As we have seen, Locke holds that reason is the law that God
has established to govern the actions of human beings, as well as the “common
bond” that unites them into a community.191 In a state of nature, it falls to
private individuals to determine what this law is and to enforce it against
wrongdoers¾a regime that is bound to lead to “Confusion and Disorder.”192
Within civil society, these functions are performed not by the “private
judgement” of individuals but by the public judgment of the community or the
government it has established.193 On this view, lawmaking draws upon the
shared reason of the lawmakers, and it requires free deliberation and debate.194
Likewise, adjudication involves the impartial application of reasonable laws
that apply equally to all.195
C. The Purposes and Limits of Government
Locke also uses the concept of rationality to identify the purposes and limits
of government. Reason enjoins individuals to preserve themselves.196 Because
they have no arbitrary power over their own lives, they cannot bestow such
power on others, including their rulers.197 More generally, Locke observes that
“no rational Creature can be supposed to change his condition with an intention
186. Id. bk. II, § 132, at 354.
187. See, e.g., id. bk. II, § 138, at 361 (contending that the property of subjects is more secure in
governments where lawmakers are chosen for a period of time and then return to being “Subjects under
the common Laws of their Country, equally with the rest”).
188. Id. bk. II, §§ 138–40, at 360–62.
189. See id. bk. II, § 112, at 343–44; id. bk. II, § 224, at 414–15.
190. Id. bk. II, § 163, at 376.
191. Id. bk. II, § 172, at 383.
192. Id. bk. II, § 13, at 275–76.
193. Id. bk. II, § 87, at 324.
194. See id. bk. II, § 222, at 413.
195. See id. bk. II, § 87, at 324; id. bk. II, § 131, at 353; id. bk. II, § 142, at 363.
196. See id. bk. II, § 6, at 271.
197. Id. bk. II, §§ 23–24 at 284–85; id. bk. II, § 135, at 357; id. bk. II, § 168, at 379–80; id. bk.
II, § 172, at 382–83.
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to be worse.”198 When individuals enter civil society, they do so “only with an
intention in every one the better to preserve himself his Liberty and
Property.”199 It follows that the society and the government are required to use
their power solely to protect the rights of citizens and to promote “the common
good.”200
In this way, Locke derives the basic principles of government from a
rigorous analysis of the choices that rational individuals would make when they
enter civil society. An objective account of natural law yields the same
conclusions: just as the law of nature in general wills “the Peace
and Preservation of all Mankind,”201 “the first and fundamental natural Law”
that applies to a particular society “is the preservation of the Society, and (as
far as will consist with the publick good) of every person in it.”202
D. Resistance and Revolution
On these grounds, Locke condemns any theory¾such as divine right¾that
holds that a ruler has absolute power over his people.203 If that were so, he
writes, then
the People under his Government are not a Society of Rational
Creatures, entred into a Community for their mutual good; they
are not such as have set Rulers over themselves, to guard, and
promote that good; but are to be looked on as an Herd of
inferiour Creatures, under the Dominion of a Master, who
keeps them, and works them for his own Pleasure or Profit. If
Men were so void of Reason, and brutish, as to enter into
Society upon such Terms, [the government might indeed
have] . . . an Arbitrary Power to do things hurtful to the
People.204
But this position must be rejected, Locke argues, “since a Rational Creature
cannot be supposed when free, to put himself into Subjection to another, for his
own harm.”205 Instead, when the government violates the rights of its citizens,
they must be allowed to question its actions without being accused of

198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

Id. bk. II, § 131, at 353.
Id.
Id.
Id. bk. II, §§ 6–7, at 270–71.
Id. bk. II, § 134, at 355–56.
See id. bk. II, § 163, at 376–77.
Id.
Id. bk. II, § 164, at 377.
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sedition.206 Moreover, individuals who are injured must be able to seek redress
from the government or the courts.207 To deny them these rights is to treat them
as though they “were degraded from the common state of Rational Creatures,”
who must always be free to assert and defend their rights, whether by means of
direct action in the state of nature or by an appeal to the law within civil
society.208
These considerations lead Locke to recognize natural rights of resistance
and revolution against oppressive governments. Under the law of nature and
reason, he explains, “no Man, or Society of Men, hav[e] a Power to deliver up
their Preservation, or consequently the means of it, to the Absolute Will and
arbitrary Dominion of another.”209 Although one gives up some of one’s natural
liberty in entering civil society, one cannot give up the right to judge whether
one’s life or freedom are being threatened.210 If the government attempts to
subject individuals to arbitrary power or unjust violence, they have a right to
use force in their own defense.211 Of course, this is a last resort, for a central
purpose of civil society is to enable people to resolve their disputes peacefully
through an appeal to the law.212 But if the government injures individuals and
at the same time leaves them with “no appeal on Earth to right them,” Locke
holds that they are entitled to “appeal to Heaven”—that is, to use force in their
own defense while trusting that God as the supreme judge will vindicate them
at the last judgment.213
What is true of individuals is also true of the people as a whole. When they
delegate political power to the government, they always retain the power to
judge whether it is fulfilling its trust by acting only for the sake of individual
rights and the common good.214 If the people determine that the government is
abusing its power in an effort “to enslave, or destroy them,” they have a right
to “appeal to Heaven,” to overthrow the government by force, and to establish
a new one that will fulfill the purposes for which it was intended.215

206. See id. bk. II, §§ 92–93, at 327–28.
207. See id. bk. II, § 20, at 281–82; id. bk. II, § 91, at 326–27.
208. Id. bk. II, § 91, at 326–27; accord id. bk. II, §§ 19–21, at 280–82.
209. Id. bk. II, § 149, at 367.
210. See id. bk. II, § 23, at 284; id. bk. II, § 168, at 380.
211. See id. bk. II, § 168, at 379–80; id. bk. II, § 208, at 404.
212. See id. bk. II, §§ 20–21, at 280–81; id. bk. II, § 125, at 351.
213. Id. bk. II, §§ 20–21, at 281–82; accord id. bk. II, § 168, at 379–80; id. bk. II, § 176, at 386;
id. bk. II, § 242, at 427.
214. See id. bk. II, § 149, at 367; id. bk. II, § 168, at 379; id. bk. II, § 240, at 426–27.
215. Id. bk. II, § 168, at 379–80; accord id. bk. II, § 240–43, at 426–28.
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V. REASON, FREEDOM, AND RELIGION
As Part IV explained, Locke’s political philosophy is based on the principle
that human beings are rational creatures who have an inherent right to think for
themselves and to pursue their own happiness. In the Two Treatises, Locke
uses this principle to criticize absolute monarchy and to call for the
establishment of civil institutions that are based on the consent of free and equal
individuals. In the Letter Concerning Toleration and other writings, Locke
takes a similar approach to the religious realm. Rejecting the authoritarianism
of the Restoration regime, he argues that the government should have no power
whatever over religion, but that all individuals have an inalienable right to
freedom of belief and worship within religious institutions that they have
voluntarily entered into.
This Part examines Locke’s theory of religious freedom. I begin by
exploring his account of the nature of religion, focusing on the roles that faith
and reason play within it. I then explain how this account led Locke to argue
for religious liberty and the separation of church and state.
A. Locke’s Conception of Religion
In the Letter Concerning Toleration, Locke maintains that our concern for
happiness is not limited to our well-being in this world, which is the object of
civil government.216 Instead, every individual also “has an Immortal Soul,
[which is] capable of Eternal Happiness or Misery.”217 To attain such
happiness, an individual must “believ[e] and do[] those things in this Life,
which are necessary to the obtaining of Gods Favour, and are prescribed by
God to that end.”218 This is the sphere of religion.
In many passages of the Letter, Locke uses the term faith to refer to the
beliefs that individuals hold about God and religion.219 But a careful reading of
these passages indicates that he often uses the term in a broad sense to refer to
all theological beliefs, not only to those that are matters of faith in a strict sense,
that is, the acceptance of truths that one believes God to have communicated
through positive revelation.220 In this section, I first discuss theological beliefs
that are based on reason and then turn to those based on revelation. Finally, I
216. See LOCKE, LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 1, at 45–47.
217. Id. at 45.
218. Id.
219. See, e.g., id. at 13–14.
220. See, e.g., id. at 14 (discussing the ways that people can seek to persuade others of religious
truths by means of “Arguments,” “Evidence,” and “Reason”).
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examine Locke’s distinctive teachings on the relationship between faith and
reason.
1. Reason
As we have seen, Locke maintains that individuals can use reason to
discover many of the most important truths about God and religion.221 First,
people can demonstrate that God exists and that he is “eternal, most powerful,
and most knowing.”222 Second, they can realize that as “intelligent, but frail
and weak Being[s], made by and depending on another [Being], who is eternal,
omnipotent, perfectly wise and good,” they ought to “honour, fear, and obey
GOD.”223 Third, they can recognize that God has given them the law of nature
and reason to live by—a law that arises from their constitution as rational
creatures and that prescribes their duties to God, other human beings, and
themselves.224 In short, human beings are capable of using “natural reason” to
discern “that there is a God, and what is required by and will be acceptable to
him thereby to avoid his anger and procure his favour.”225
For Locke, these truths of “Natural Religion”226 lie at the core of all
reasonable religion. By using their minds to discern these truths, individuals
come “to be rational creatures” who understand their own nature and their
relationship with God.227 Natural religion teaches human beings how they can
live a “Good Life” by developing moral and religious virtue, by following the
law of nature, and by acting with “Charity . . . and Good-will in general towards
all Mankind.”228 According to Locke, living such a life is “the best worship”
of God and the main “Business of True Religion.”229 A good life is not only
221. See supra text accompanying notes 103–06.
222. LOCKE, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 12, bk. IV, ch. X, § 6, at 621.
223. Id. bk. IV, ch. XIII, § 3, at 651; accord id. bk. IV, ch. XI, §§ 13–14, at 638 (explaining how
reason can establish “universal” and “Eternal Truths,” including the proposition “That Men ought to
fear and obey GOD”).
224. See LOCKE, LAW OF NATURE, supra note 12, qu. V, fol. 61, at 169; LOCKE,
REASONABLENESS OF CHRISTIANITY, supra note 76, ch. XI, at 119.
225. John Locke, Religion (1681), in LOCKE: POLITICAL ESSAYS, supra note 71, at 278, 278–
79.
226. LOCKE, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 12, bk. III, ch. IX, § 23, at 490.
227. LOCKE, CONDUCT, supra note 78, § 8, at 182; accord LOCKE, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING,
supra note 12, bk. IV, ch. XIII, § 3, at 651.
228. LOCKE, LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 1, at 8, 45; see also JOHN LOCKE,
A THIRD LETTER FOR TOLERATION (1692) (discussing the content of natural religion), in 5 THE
WORKS OF JOHN LOCKE 139, 156 (12th ed. 1823) [hereinafter LOCKE, THIRD LETTER FOR
TOLERATION].
229. LOCKE, LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 1, at 8; LOCKE, THIRD LETTER FOR
TOLERATION, supra note 228, at 156; see also John Locke, Civil and Ecclesiastical Power (1674), in

HEYMAN - MULR VOL. 101, NO. 3 (PDF).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

THE LIGHT OF NATURE

5/4/18 4:02 PM

739

vital for attaining salvation, it also contributes to the well-being of the
commonwealth.230 In addition, because the truths of “natural religion
and . . . morality” are founded upon reason rather than revelation, they are
matters that the adherents of different religions can agree upon.231 Finally, he
maintains that “the Precepts of Natural Religion are plain, and very intelligible
to all Mankind” by the “light of Reason,” while revelation is often contained in
ancient texts that may be difficult to interpret.232 For all these reasons, he
contends that the truths of natural religion should hold a central place in
religious life.233
Although it was powerful, Locke’s theory of natural religion was not
without its difficulties. One problem had to do with the status of the law of
nature. According to Locke, for something to be a law, it must not only express
the will of a lawgiver but must also be enforced by means of rewards and
punishments.234 Is that true of the law of nature? In the Second Treatise, Locke
contends that, in the state of nature, every individual has the power to enforce
that law against wrongdoers, and that this function is taken over by the
government within civil society.235 By these means, the law of nature is
enforced in this world. Yet this enforcement is imperfect in several important
ways. First, some wrongdoers may be too powerful for other people to bring
to account.236 Second, Locke’s conception of the law of nature or “the Moral
Law” goes far beyond what is needed to protect other individuals and the
society.237 Instead, that law sets an ideal standard of virtue and goodness that
arises from the nature of rational creatures.238 This law encompasses not only
the duties that one owes to one’s fellow creatures but also the duties that one
owes to oneself and God.239 Moreover, this law governs the inner life of
LOCKE: POLITICAL ESSAYS, supra note 71, at 216–17, 219 [hereinafter Locke, Civil and Ecclesiastical
Power] (referring to morality as the “real part of religion”).
230. See LOCKE, LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 1, at 45.
231. John Locke, A Discourse of Miracles (1706), in 8 THE WORKS OF JOHN LOCKE 256, 261
(12th ed. 1823); accord LOCKE, THIRD LETTER FOR TOLERATION, supra note 228, at 156.
232. LOCKE, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 12, bk. III, ch. IX, § 23, at 490.
233. See id.
234. See, e.g., id. bk. I, ch. IV, § 8, at 87; id. bk. II, ch. XXVIII, §§ 5–6, at 351–52.
235. See, e.g., LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra note 9, bk. II, §§ 7–13, at 271–76; id. bk. II, § 87,
at 323–24; id. bk. II, §§ 128–30, at 352–53.
236. See id. bk. II, § 126, at 351. Of course, this can be especially true of rulers who abuse their
power. See id. bk. II, §§ 91–93, at 326–28; id. bk. II, § 137, at 359–60.
237. LOCKE, REASONABLENESS OF CHRISTIANITY, supra note 76, ch. III, at 20; accord id. ch.
XIV, at 147–48.
238. See id. ch. II, at 13–14; id. ch. XIV, at 147–48.
239. See supra text accompanying notes 133–35.
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individuals as well as their external conduct.240 In these ways, the natural or
moral law “set[s] forth the Duties of a good Life in their full Obligation and
Extent, beyond what . . . the Civil Laws of any Country could prescribe or take
notice of.”241
For Locke, then, the law of nature can be a true law only if it is enforced by
rewards and punishments in another life. In the Essay, he asserts that “it is
evident” that God, who ordained that we should live in this world as “sensible
intelligent Beings . . . can and will restore us to the like state of Sensibility in
another World, and make us capable there to receive the Retribution he has
designed to Men, according to their doings in this Life.”242
What grounds do human beings have to believe in this future state of
rewards and punishments? At one point in the Essay, Locke offers a version of
Pascal’s wager:
He that will allow exquisite and endless Happiness to be but
the possible consequence of a good Life here, and the contrary
state the possible Reward of a bad one; must own himself to
judge very much amiss, if he does not conclude, that a vertuous
Life, with the certain expectation of everlasting Bliss, which
may come, is to be preferred to a vicious one, with the fear of
that dreadful state of Misery, which ‘tis very possible may
overtake the guilty; or at best the terrible uncertain hope of
Annihilation . . . . [W]hen infinite Happiness is put in one
Scale, against infinite Misery in the other; if the worst, that
comes to the pious Man, if he mistakes, be the best that the
wicked can attain to, if he be in the right, Who can without
madness run the venture? 243
As Locke concedes, however, this argument does not show that “a future Life”
is certain or even probable.244 Instead, the argument merely contends that such

240. See LOCKE, REASONABLENESS OF CHRISTIANITY, supra note 76, ch. XII, at 122–23
(discussing the Sermon on the Mount in Matthew 5–7 and the Sermon on the Plain in Luke 6).
241. Id. ch. IX, at 58. In this passage, Locke is referring to the teachings of Christ¾teachings
that Locke treats as largely identical to the law of nature and reason. See infra text accompanying
notes 273–75.
242. LOCKE, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 12, bk. IV, ch. III, § 6, at 542.
243. Id. bk. II, ch. XXI, § 70, at 281–82. On Pascal’s wager, see BLAISE PASCAL, PENSÉES
§ 233 (W.F. Trotter trans., Dent 1910) (1660); Pascal’s Wager, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY,
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/pascal-wager/
[https://perma.cc/LJN8-DQTY] (last visited Apr. 2, 2018).
244. LOCKE, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 12, bk. II, ch. XXI, § 70, at 282.
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a life “is at least possible,” and that a rational person would act as though there
were one.245
More generally, Locke’s defense of a future state is based on the notion that
“the great Ends of Morality and Religion” require it.246 On Locke’s view,
morality and religion are based on the law of nature.247 But the law of nature
can be a true law only if it is backed up by rewards and punishments in a future
state.248 In the absence of this state, the entire Lockean structure of morality
would collapse.
One way to see this point is by recurring to the concept of a rational
creature. On one hand, a rational creature recognizes that he should live in
peace and harmony with others according to reason, which forbids causing
injury to others.249 Yet on the other hand, a rational creature necessarily pursues
his own happiness.250 His motive for action is to attain pleasure and avoid
pain,251 and this may lead him to engage in conduct that does injure others. For
Locke, the solution to this paradox is that God enforces the law of nature with
rewards and punishments in a future life.252 By means of these incentives,
rational creatures are led to pursue their own happiness in ways that are
consonant with the happiness of all. This is part of what Locke means when he
says (in a passage that we looked at earlier) that “Law, in its true Notion, is not
so much the Limitation as the direction of a free and intelligent Agent to his
proper Interest,” and that it “prescribes no farther than is for the general Good
of those under that Law.”253 Through the incentives that it provides, the law
brings the agent’s own “Interest” into alignment with “the general Good” of
all.254
Closely related to this argument from morality is an argument from desert,
combined with a teleological view that God desires human beings to strive after
the perfection of their rational nature, a condition that includes immortality. As
Locke puts it, “God has set some Things in broad day-light” and “has given us
245. Id.
246. Id. bk. IV, ch. III, § 6, at 542.
247. See supra text accompanying notes 222–41.
248. See supra text accompanying notes 242–45.
249. See LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra note 9, bk. II, § 6, at 271.
250. See LOCKE, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 12, bk. II, ch. XXI, §§ 36–71, at 254–
84; id. bk. IV, ch. XXI, § 21, at 720–21.
251. See id. bk. II, ch. XXI, §§ 41–42, at 258–59.
252. See id. bk. II, ch. XXI, § 60, at 273–74; id. bk. II, ch. XXI, § 70, at 281–82.
253. LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra note 9, bk. II, § 57, at 305; supra text accompanying note
157.
254. LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, bk. II, § 57, at 305.
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some certain Knowledge,” in order to give us “a Taste of what intellectual
Creatures are capable of, to excite in us a Desire and Endeavor after a better
State.”255 In this way, God encourages us to use our minds in “the twilight” of
uncertainty by searching out “and following . . . that way, which might lead us
to a State of greater Perfection.”256 On this view, Locke concludes, it is “highly
rational to think, even were Revelation silent in the Case, That as Men employ
those Talents, God has given them here, they shall accordingly receive their
Rewards at the close of the day, when their Sun shall set, and Night shall put
an end to their Labours.”257
2. Faith
These are the main reasons that Locke offers for believing in a future state
in which individuals will be rewarded or punished for their deeds on earth.
Clearly, however, these considerations fall far short of rational demonstration
or certainty. Instead, at best they show that there is a greater or lesser
probability of a future state. This weakens the incentives that individuals have
to live virtuous and pious lives in this world, as well as their hopes of attaining
immortality and happiness in the next.
On this ground, among others, Locke argues that there are benefits to
moving beyond “pure Natural Religion” and embracing Christianity, a religion
that is founded not only on reason but also on faith.258 In a strict sense, faith
means the assent to a proposition not because it has been “made out by the
Deductions of Reason,” but rather “upon the Credit of the Proposer, [that is] as
coming from GOD” through “Revelation.”259
Toward the end of The Reasonableness of Christianity, Locke canvasses
the advantages that come from the revelation contained in the New
Testament.260 One of the chief advantages relates to the assurance of an afterlife
with its attendant rewards and punishments.261 As he explains, it is hardly
surprising that people did not choose to live a virtuous life at a time when its
benefits seemed to be outweighed by its difficulties and costs:
255. LOCKE, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 12, bk. IV, ch. XIV, § 2, at 652.
256. Id.
257. Id. The reference to “Revelation” seems to include Jesus’s parable of the talents, see
Matthew 25:14–30; Luke 19:12–28, as well as his parable of the laborers who are paid at the end of the
day, see Matthew 20:1-16.
258. LOCKE, REASONABLENESS OF CHRISTIANITY, supra note 76, ch. I, at 5; id. ch. III, at 17–
21.
259. LOCKE, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 12, bk. IV, ch. XVIII, § 2, at 689.
260. See LOCKE, REASONABLENESS OF CHRISTIANITY, supra note 76, ch. XV, at 164–65.
261. See id. ch. XIV, at 162–63.
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Mankind, who are and must be allowed to pursue their
Happiness; Nay, cannot be hindred; Could not but think
themselves excused from a strict observation of Rules, which
appeared so little to consist with their chief End, Happiness;
Whilst they kept them from the enjoyments of [this] Life; And
they had little evidence and security of another.262
But all of this changed when Christ came and “brought life and immortality to
light.”263 The classical philosophers had shown
the beauty of Virtue: They set her off so as drew Mens Eyes
and approbation to her: But leaving her unendowed, very few
were willing to espouse her. . . . But now there being put into
the Scales, on her side, An exceeding and immortal weight of
Glory; Interest is come about to her; And Virtue now is visibly
the most enriching purchase, and by much the best bargain.
That she is the perfection and excellency of our Nature; That
she is her self a Reward, and will recommend our Names to
future Ages, is not all that can now be said [of] her . . . . It has
another relish and efficacy, to perswade Men that if they live
well here, they shall be happy hereafter. Open their Eyes upon
the endless unspeakable joys of another Life; And their Hearts
will find something solid and powerful to move them. The
view of Heaven and Hell, will cast a slight upon the short
pleasures and pains of this present state; and give attractions
and encouragements to Virtue, which reason, and interest, and
the Care of ourselves, cannot but allow and prefer.264
According to Locke, this is the only solid “foundation” for “Morality.”265
Remarkably, Locke also maintains that revelation plays a vital role in
identifying the content of natural law. In the Essay, he had expressed optimism
that reason was capable of working out the principles of morality with a quasimathematical rigor.266 As he acknowledges in The Reasonableness of
Christianity, however, in practice philosophers had never succeeded in

262. Id. ch. XIV, at 161.
263. Id. ch. XIV at 162 (quoting 1 Timothy 1:10); accord JOHN LOCKE, MR. LOCKE’S REPLY TO
THE RIGHT REVEREND THE LORD BISHOP OF WORCESTER’S ANSWER TO HIS SECOND LETTER (1698),
in 4 THE WORKS OF JOHN LOCKE 191, 489 (new ed. 1823), supra note 228, at 191, 489.
264. LOCKE, REASONABLENESS OF CHRISTIANITY, supra note 76, ch. XIV, at 162–63 (footnote
omitted) (quoting 2 Corinthians 4:17 (stating “eternal weight” rather than, as here, “immortal
weight”)).
265. Id. ch. XIV, at 163.
266. See supra text accompanying note 132.
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developing a full account of morality, at least in the times before Christ came.267
And even if they had, their moral teaching would have lacked the binding
authority that can derive only from a clear recognition that the moral law has
been given by God and is backed with rewards and punishments.268
On these grounds, Locke concludes that it seems to be “too hard a task for
unassisted Reason, to establish Morality in all its parts, upon its true
foundations; with a clear and convincing light”: “Natural Religion in its full
extent, was no where, that I know, taken care of by the force of Natural
Reason.”269 Instead, people’s “first knowledge of [these] truths . . . [is] owing
to Revelation” as contained in the New Testament.270 These truths can be
summed up in the “Golden Rule” articulated in the Sermon on the Mount¾“All
things whatsoever ye would have that Men should do to you, do ye even so to
them”271—as well as in the “great rule, that we should love our neighbour as
ourselves”—a rule that Locke suggests is “such a fundamental truth for the
regulating human society, that . . . by that alone one might without difficulty
determine all the cases and doubts in social morality.”272
On this view, it might seem that the law of God that is communicated by
revelation supersedes the law of nature that is discovered through reason. For
Locke, however, these two laws are fundamentally the same. Both represent
the will of God, whether that will is revealed by Scripture or by the light of
nature.273 The truths known through revelation are “agreeable to Reason” and
“confirm[ed]” by reason.274 They are identical to the law that arises from our
“very Nature” as rational creatures.275 For Locke, one of the most basic aspects
of faith is the belief that the universe is rational and is governed by a good and
just God276¾a belief that underlies his whole account of human nature and
morality.

267. LOCKE, REASONABLENESS OF CHRISTIANITY, supra note 76, ch. XIV, at 148–55.
268. See id. ch. XIV, at 152–54.
269. Id. ch. XIV, at 148.
270. Id. ch. XIV, at 149.
271. Id. ch. XII, at 123 (quoting Matthew 7:12).
272. LOCKE, CONDUCT, supra note 78, § 43, at 223 (paraphrasing Matthew 22:39 and Mark
12:31).
273. See LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra note 9, bk. I, § 86, at 205; LOCKE, HUMAN
UNDERSTANDING, supra note 12, bk. II, ch. XXVIII, § 8, at 352; id. bk. IV, ch. VII, § 11, at 598–99;
id. bk. IV, ch. XIX, § 4, at 698; LOCKE, REASONABLENESS OF CHRISTIANITY, supra note 76, ch. III,
at 18–21; id. ch. XIV, at 139–41, 147–59.
274. LOCKE, REASONABLENESS OF CHRISTIANITY, supra note 76, ch. XIV, at 149, 156.
275. Id. ch. XI, at 119.
276. See supra text accompanying notes 221–57.
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3. The Relationship Between Faith and Reason
As this discussion makes clear, Locke rejects the common view that faith
is opposed to reason and can override the clear teachings of reason.277
According to Locke, “Faith is nothing but a firm Assent of the Mind.”278 As
“rational Creature[s],” individuals have a “Duty” to “regulate[]” their beliefs so
that they are founded on “good Reason.”279 By contrast, one who “believes,
without having any Reason for believing, may be in love with his own Fancies;
but neither seeks Truth as he ought, nor pays the Obedience due to his Maker,
who would have him use those discerning Faculties he has given him, to keep
him out of Mistake and Errour.”280
For Locke, this view has crucial implications for an approach to revelation.
Where God has revealed a truth, one is absolutely bound to believe it, since it
comes from a being who is all-knowing and incapable of lying or deceit.281 At
the same time, however, reason imposes critical constraints on what one can
believe. First, although one must believe what God communicates through
revelation, one must use reason to determine whether something counts as a
revelation in the first place.282 For example, Locke contends that the miracles
that Christ performed constitute irrefutable evidence that the New Testament
constitutes a true revelation.283
Second, reason sets bounds to the content of what can be accepted as
revelation. In this regard, Locke distinguishes between three kinds of
propositions: those that are according to reason, those that are above reason,
and those that are contrary to reason.284 Revelation can teach things that are
“According to Reason,” such as the idea that God exists285 or the moral truths
that are contained in the Gospel.286 In addition, revelation can teach things that
are “Above Reason.”287 For example, while one’s natural faculties can tell one
277. See LOCKE, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 12, bk. IV, ch. XVII, § 24, at 687–88;
id. bk. IV, ch. XVIII, § 11, at 696.
278. Id. bk. IV, ch. XVII, § 24, at 687.
279. Id. bk. IV, ch. XVII, § 24 at 687–88.
280. Id.
281. See id. bk. IV, ch. XVIII, § 5, at 692; id. bk. IV, ch. XVIII, § 8, at 694.
282. See id. bk. IV, ch. XVIII, § 6, at 693; id. bk. IV, ch. XVIII, § 8, at 694; id. bk. IV, ch. XVIII,
§ 10, at 695.
283. See LOCKE, REASONABLENESS OF CHRISTIANITY, supra note 76, ch. XIV, at 142–43, 146–
47, 153.
284. See LOCKE, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 12, bk. IV, ch. XVII, § 23, at 687.
285. See id. For Locke’s argument that the existence of God is rationally demonstrable, see
supra text accompanying notes 103–06.
286. See supra text accompanying notes 273–75.
287. LOCKE, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 12, bk. IV, ch. XVII, § 23, at 687.

HEYMAN - MULR VOL. 101, NO. 3 (PDF).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

746

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

5/4/18 4:02 PM

[101:705

nothing about the existence of spirits, the New Testament relates “that [a] part
of the Angels rebelled against GOD, and thereby lost their first happy state.”288
Similarly, Scripture teaches “that the dead shall rise, and live again” when
Christ comes to judge the world.289 These things, “being beyond the Discovery
of Reason, are purely Matters of Faith; with which Reason has, directly,
nothing to do.”290
By contrast, Locke insists that one cannot have faith in any supposed
revelation that is “Contrary to Reason,” in the sense that it contradicts what is
known “either by immediate intuition . . . or by evident deductions of
Reason”291—a category that clearly appears to include the principles of the law
of nature, which are discerned through reason.292 As he explains:
Faith can never convince us of any Thing, that contradicts our
Knowledge. Because though Faith be founded on the
Testimony of GOD (who cannot lye) revealing any Proposition
to us: yet we cannot have an assurance of the Truth of its being
a
divine
Revelation,
greater
than
our
own
Knowledge. . . . [For] we cannot tell how to conceive that to
come from GOD, the bountiful Author of our Being, which if
received for true, must overturn all the Principles and
Foundations of Knowledge he has given us; render all our
Faculties useless; wholly destroy the most excellent Part of his
Workmanship, our Understandings; and put a Man in a
Condition, wherein he will have less Light, less Conduct than
the Beast that perisheth.293
Finally, and for similar reasons, people must use reason when interpreting the
words of a revelation, and strive to understand them in a way that is not contrary
to reason.294

288. Id. bk. IV, ch. XVIII, § 7, at 694; accord id. bk. IV, ch. XI, § 12, at 637.
289. Id. bk. IV, ch. XVIII, § 7, at 694.
290. Id.
291. Id. bk. IV, ch. XVII, § 23, at 687; id. bk. IV, ch. XVIII, § 5, at 691.
292. On these principles as deductions of reason, see supra text accompanying notes 132–35.
293. LOCKE, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 12, bk. IV, ch. XVIII, § 5, at 692–93. For
an earlier statement of this position, see John Locke, Faith and Reason (1676), in LOCKE: POLITICAL
ESSAYS, supra note 71, at 248, 249–50.
294. See LOCKE, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 12, bk. IV, ch. XVIII, § 8, at 694; cf. id.
bk. III, ch. IX, § 23, at 490 (urging that we should “be more careful and diligent in observing” the
“plain, and very intelligible” “Precepts of Natural Religion,” which are found through the “light of
Reason,” “and less magisterial, positive, and imperious, in imposing our own sense and interpretations”
of the “other revealed Truths” that are conveyed in obscure and difficult passages of Scripture).
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Locke concludes by observing that, when faith keeps within its proper
bounds, it causes no “violence or hindrance to Reason; which is not injured, or
disturbed, but assisted and improved, by new Discoveries of Truth, coming
from the Eternal Fountain of all Knowledge.”295 Understood in this way, faith
is “nothing else but an Assent founded on the highest Reason.”296 By contrast,
the belief that faith is opposed to reason is responsible for “those Absurdities,
that fill almost all the Religions which possess and divide Mankind.”297 To the
extent that this belief is accepted, “there will, in matter of Religion, be no room
for Reason at all,” with the result that religion, which “ought most peculiarly to
elevate us, as rational Creatures, above Brutes, is that wherein Men often appear
most irrational, and more senseless than Beasts themselves.”298
B. Religious Liberty and the Relationship Between Church and State
Now that we have discussed Locke’s conception of religion, let us explore
his theory of religious liberty and the relationship between church and state.
1. Religious Liberty
Locke holds that because individuals are rational creatures, they are
inherently free.299 This freedom takes two forms that are relevant for present
purposes. First, as Locke indicates in the Second Treatise, individuals have
what may be called external freedom, that is, the rights to enjoy life and liberty
and to acquire and possess property in the external world.300 Second, as he
emphasizes in A Letter Concerning Toleration, individuals have the liberty to
believe and worship as they think fit.301
In a state of nature, individuals possess both forms of freedom. Precisely
because life, liberty, and property are external, however, they are vulnerable to
attack by others.302 Although individuals are entitled to use force to protect
themselves from aggression, in practice they will often lack the strength to do
so.303 For this reason, Locke holds that rational individuals would agree to give
295. Id. bk. IV, ch. XVIII, § 10, at 695.
296. Id. bk. IV, ch. XVI, § 14, at 668.
297. Id. bk. IV, ch. XVIII, § 11, at 696.
298. Id.
299. See supra text accompanying note 150.
300. See LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra note 9, bk. II, § 4, at 269; id. bk. II, § 6, at 271; id. bk. II,
§ 123, at 350.
301. See LOCKE, LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 1, at 15–17, 32–33, 38, 47–48,
53, 58–59.
302. See id. at 46–47.
303. See LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra note 9, bk. II, § 126, at 351.
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up some of their external freedom and enter into civil society for the protection
of their life, liberty, and property.304
By contrast, Locke contends that when they make the social contract,
rational individuals would not give up any of their religious liberty or grant the
government any power over religious matters.305 Nor can it be shown that God
or the law of nature have conferred any such power on the government.306 It
follows that while the government may use force to regulate the external
conduct of individuals toward one another, it may not use force to interfere with
their liberty of worship or belief.307
Before considering the arguments that Locke makes for this position, it will
be helpful to briefly describe his views on the nature of belief and knowledge.
According to Locke, belief and knowledge are partly “voluntary” and partly
“necessary.”308 One can freely decide whether to look in a particular direction
or to turn one’s thoughts to the consideration of a particular matter.309 Having
done so, however, what one comes to see or know is not a matter of choice. As
Locke explains:
[A]ll that is voluntary in our Knowledge, is the employing, or
with-holding any of our Faculties from this or that sort of
Objects, and a more, or less accurate survey of them: But they
being employed, our Will hath no Power to determine the
Knowledge of the Mind one way or other; that is done only by
the Objects themselves, as far as they are clearly discovered.310
The same thing is true of matters that are the subject of faith or opinion rather
than of knowledge.311
With this background, let us explore Locke’s claim that when rational
individuals form civil society, they would not surrender their religious liberty
or accord the government any power over religious matters. In A Letter
Concerning Toleration, Locke makes several arguments for this position.
(1) The inalienability of religious liberty—Locke’s leading argument is that
individuals would not give the ruler or “the Civil Magistrate” any authority over
religion
304. See id. bk. II, §§ 87–89, at 323–25; id. bk. II, §§ 127–31, at 352–53.
305. See LOCKE, LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 1, at 13.
306. See id.; LOCKE, THIRD LETTER FOR TOLERATION, supra note 228, ch. II, at 202.
307. See LOCKE, LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 1, at 12–15, 46–47.
308. LOCKE, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 12, bk. IV, ch. XIII, § 1, at 650.
309. See id. bk. IV, ch. XIII, §§ 1–2, at 650.
310. Id. bk. IV, ch. XIII, § 2, at 650–51.
311. See id. bk. IV, ch. XV, § 5, at 656; id. bk. IV, ch. XVI, § 1, at 657–58; id. bk. IV, ch. XVI,
§ 9, at 663.
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because no man can so far abandon the care of his own
Salvation, as blindly to leave it to the choice of any other,
whether Prince or Subject, to prescribe to him what Faith or
Worship he shall embrace. For no Man can, if he would,
conform his Faith to the Dictates, of another. All the Life and
Power of true Religion consists in the inward and full
perswasion of the mind: And Faith is not Faith without
believing. Whatever Profession we make, to whatever outward
Worship we conform, if we are not fully satisfied in our own
mind that the one is true, and the other well pleasing unto God;
such Profession and such Practice, far from being any
furtherance, are indeed great Obstacles to our Salvation.312
This argument rests on the notion that we are rational creatures who seek
happiness not only in this world but also in the world to come.313 To attain
salvation, we must use our minds to discover the truth about God and the path
he wants us to follow. The freedom to do this is inalienable, for as a rational
creature I can never “abandon the care of [my] own Salvation,” nor can I allow
anyone else to do my thinking for me.314 To do so would not only be in inherent
conflict with my nature as an intelligent being, it would also be futile, for the
act of believing can be effective only if I engage in it myself, and I can gain no
benefit from beliefs that I do not actually hold.315 Moreover, I could not
“conform [my] Faith to the Dictates, of another” even if I wanted to, since what
one believes is not voluntary, but is determined by the objects that one
considers.316 For these reasons, the magistrate can derive no power over
religion from “the Consent of the People” when they enter civil society.317 And
according to Locke, revelation points in the same direction, for “it appears not
that God has ever given any such Authority to one Man over another, as to
compell any one to his Religion.”318
312. LOCKE, LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 1, at 13.
313. See id. at 13, 15, 45–47; LOCKE, REASONABLENESS OF CHRISTIANITY, supra note 76, ch.
XIV, at 161–63; Locke, Civil and Ecclesiastical Power, supra note 229, at 216–19.
314. LOCKE, LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 1, at 13.
315. For an earlier expression of this point, see Locke, Toleration A, supra note 72, at 232.
316. LOCKE, LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 1, at 13; see supra text
accompanying notes 308-11.
317. LOCKE, LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 1, at 13. An earlier version of
this inalienability argument appears in the unpublished essay on toleration that Locke wrote in 1667.
See JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING TOLERATION (1667), in AN ESSAY CONCERNING
TOLERATION AND OTHER WRITINGS ON LAW AND POLITICS 1667–1683, at 267, 272 (J. R. Milton &
Philip Milton eds., Clarendon Press 2006) [hereinafter LOCKE, ESSAY CONCERNING TOLERATION].
318. LOCKE, LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 1, at 13.
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(2) The inefficacy of force—The notion that belief is involuntary also plays
an important part in Locke’s second argument for rejecting governmental
authority over religious belief. The magistrate can have no such authority,
Locke writes,
because his Power consists only in outward force: But true and
saving Religion consists in the inward perswasion of the Mind;
without which nothing can be acceptable to God. And such is
the nature of the Understanding, that it cannot be compell’d to
the belief of any thing by outward Force. Confiscation of
Estate, Imprisonment, Torments, nothing of that Nature can
have any such Efficacy as to make Men change the inward
Judgment that they have framed of things.319
Instead, “[i]t is only Light and Evidence that can work a change in Mens
Opinions.”320 To put it another way, “it is absurd that things should be enjoyned
by Laws, which are not in mens power to perform. And to believe this or that
to be true, does not depend upon our Will.”321
(3) The fallibility of rulers—Locke further argues that even if the magistrate
did have effective means to alter the beliefs of individuals, that “would
not . . . help at all to the Salvation of their Souls,” for the magistrate has no
more insight into religious truth than his subjects do.322 It would therefore be
senseless to require them “to quit the Light of their own Reason; to oppose the
Dictates of their own Consciences; and blindly to resign up themselves to the
Will of their Governors, and to the Religion, which either Ignorance, Ambition,
or Superstition had chanced to establish in the Countries where they were
born.”323 Instead, Locke asserts that “Truth certainly would do well enough, if
she were once left to shift for her Self.”324
In the Letter, Locke makes points (2) and (3) in objective terms: because
force is incapable of changing minds and civil rulers have no special insight
into religious matters, it is objectively unreasonable to hold that those rulers
have any power in the religious sphere. But it is easy to see how these two
points can also be recast to support Locke’s claim that rational individuals
would not grant such power to civil rulers. In some of his other writings, Locke
does suggest arguments of this sort. For example, in the Third Letter for
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.

Id. at 13.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 44; accord LOCKE, ESSAY CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 317, at 272.
LOCKE, LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 1, at 14–15, 28.
Id. at 14–15.
Id. at 45.
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Toleration, he intimates that the people would not grant such power, for the use
of that power by fallible magistrates would cause “much more harm than
good . . . towards the propagating the true religion in the world.”325
(4) The lack of injury to others—Finally, Locke argues that religious belief
and worship are beyond the government’s power because they cause “no
Injury” to others.326 As he explains more fully in the Third Letter, individuals
would form a commonwealth solely to protect themselves against such injuries
as could be prevented only by force, since other ends could be pursued equally
well through nonpolitical forms of society.327 “Now since no man, or society
of men, can by their opinions in religion, or ways of worship, do any man who
differed from them any injury,” Locke contends, “the punishing any opinion in
religion or ways of worship by the force given the magistrate, could not be
intended by those who constituted or entered into the commonwealth.”328 On
the contrary, because everyone in a state of nature has a right to be free from
force in matters of religion, “protection from such injury is one of the ends of a
commonwealth, and so every man has a right to toleration.”329
For all these reasons, Locke concludes “that Liberty of Conscience is every
mans natural Right” and that individuals retain this right when they enter
society.330 The magistrate has no authority to restrict religious liberty but
instead has a duty to tolerate the adherents of all religions (with the exceptions
discussed below) and to protect their civil rights by means of equal laws.331
Moreover, Locke holds that the duty of toleration is not confined to the
magistrate but extends to everyone in the society. In an important passage, he
writes that no church or
private Person has any Right, in any manner, to prejudice
another Person in his Civil Enjoyments, because he is of
another Church or Religion. All the Rights and Franchises that
325. LOCKE, THIRD LETTER FOR TOLERATION, supra note 228, ch. II, at 213.
326. LOCKE, LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 1, at 37; accord id. at 20, 41, 44–
45; LOCKE, ESSAY CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 317, at 274; Locke, Civil and Ecclesiastical
Power, supra note 259, at 219; John Locke, Critical Notes upon Edward Stillingfleet’s Mischief and
Unreasonableness of Separation (n.d.), in WRITINGS ON RELIGION 73, 74–75, ms. at 76 (Victor Nuovo
ed., 2002) [hereinafter Locke, Notes on Stillingfleet].
327. See LOCKE, THIRD LETTER FOR TOLERATION, supra note 228, ch. II, at 212.
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. LOCKE, LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 1, at 53; see also LOCKE, ESSAY
CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 317, at 271, 275 (contending that “in speculations &
religious worship every man hath a perfect uncontrould liberty” and “an absolute & universall right
to toleration”).
331. See LOCKE, LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 1, at 12–15, 57.
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belong to him as a Man, or as a Denison, are inviolably to be
Preserved to him. These are not the Business of Religion. No
Violence nor Injury is to be offered him, whether he be
Christian or Pagan. Nay, we must not content our selves with
the narrow Measures of bare Justice. Charity, Bounty, and
Liberality must be added to it. This the Gospel enjoyns; this
Reason directs; and this that natural Fellowship we are born
into requires of us. If any man err from the right way, it is his
own Misfortune, no Injury to thee: Nor therefore art thou to
punish him in the things of this Life, because thou supposest
he will be miserable in that which is to come.332
This passage highlights several points that are essential for understanding
Locke’s view. First, the duty of toleration applies to private parties as well as
to the government. Second, this duty comprises not merely a negative
obligation to refrain from harming others on account of religion, but also a
positive injunction to treat them with “Charity” and “Liberality.”333 Third, this
duty is said to arise from “the Gospel” as well as from “Reason” and from
membership in the natural community of mankind.334 In this way, Locke
equates the revealed law of God with the law of nature and reason. This is
consistent with his view that reason and revelation have the same content, as
well as his view that the law of nature includes both positive and negative
obligations.335 Fourth, because the duty of toleration arises from the law of
nature as well as from the Gospel, that duty is not limited to “the mutual
Toleration of Christians in their different Professions of Religion,” as he puts it
at the outset of the Letter.336 Instead, the duty also extends to the members of
other religions, including the “Pagan[s]” he refers to here, as well as the Jews
and Muslims he discusses elsewhere.337 Finally, all of this underscores the
broader point that Locke’s argument in the Letter is based on natural religion
and natural rights as much as on Christian theology.
So far, we have been focusing on the arguments that Locke makes for
religious toleration based on the inherent liberty of individuals. But the subject
can also be approached from the standpoint of their inherent duties. Under the
332. Id. at 20.
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. See supra text accompanying notes 156, 273–75.
336. LOCKE, LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 1, at 7.
337. See id. at 58–59 (“[N]either Pagan, nor Mahumetan, nor Jew, ought to be excluded from
the Civil Rights of the Commonwealth, because of his Religion.”). For an exploration of Locke’s view,
see MARSHALL, EARLY ENLIGHTENMENT, supra note 8, ch. 19, at 593.
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law of nature, individuals are bound to worship God and to obey his will.338
Because their eternal happiness depends on believing and doing the things that
God has prescribed, “the observance of these things is the highest Obligation
that lies upon Mankind, and . . . our utmost Care, Application, and Diligence,
ought to be exercised in the Search and Performance of them.”339 An individual
who adheres to erroneous beliefs or modes of worship causes no injury to
anyone else.340 It follows that no one has a right to interfere with such worship
or belief, which are matters solely between oneself and God.341 If the magistrate
should attempt to do so, one has not only a right but a duty to follow one’s own
conscience, “[f]or Obedience is due in the first place to God, and afterwards to
the Laws.”342 In this way, the “Liberty” that individuals have in religious
matters can also be seen as a function of their duty towards God.343
2. The Separation of Church and State
For Locke, the same considerations that support the protection of religious
liberty also mandate the separation of church and state. Indeed, these principles
are merely two sides of the same coin. Because religious liberty is an inherent
and inalienable right, rational individuals would not cede any of it to the polity
when they make the social contract and establish civil government.344 It follows
that “the whole Jurisdiction of the Magistrate reaches only to [the Civil Interests
of its members] . . . ; and that it neither can nor ought in any manner to be
extended to the Salvation of Souls.”345
Instead, that concern lies within the sphere of religious societies or
churches. In opposition to the traditional view which was embraced by the
Restoration religious and political order, Locke insists that “No Man by nature
is bound unto any particular Church or Sect, but every one joins himself
voluntarily to that Society in which he believes he has found that Profession
and Worship which is truly acceptable unto God.”346 As a “free and voluntary
Society,” a church has the power to make rules to govern itself as well as to

338. See supra text accompanying note 223.
339. LOCKE, LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 1, at 45.
340. See id. at 45–46.
341. See id.; LOCKE, ESSAY CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 317, at 271–75; Locke,
Notes on Stillingfleet, supra note 326, at 73–75, ms. at 19, 76.
342. LOCKE, LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 1, at 48.
343. Id. at 47–48. For a persuasive argument to this effect, see Harris, supra note 8.
344. See LOCKE, LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 1, at 13.
345. Id. at 12–13.
346. Id. at 15; accord Locke, Notes on Stillingfleet, supra note 326, at 75, ms. at 78.
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establish its own articles of faith and forms of worship.347 When individuals
deviate from the doctrine or discipline of the church to which they belong, it
may respond with persuasion, admonition, and ultimately excommunication.348
But the church may not use any force against its members or deprive them of
their civil goods, let alone “persecute others, and force [them] by Fire and
Sword, to embrace her Faith and Doctrine.”349 Civil goods belong to
individuals as human beings and as members of the commonwealth; those
goods are within the jurisdiction and the protection of the civil magistrate and
may not be invaded on grounds of religion.350
For these reasons, Locke holds that the commonwealth and the church (or
rather churches) must be regarded as “absolutely separate and
distinct . . . . Societies; which are in their Original, End, Business, and in every
thing, . . . infinitely different from each other.”351 The state is empowered to
use force to promote the happiness of individuals in this world, while churches
use spiritual means to promote their happiness in the world to come.352
3. Conclusion
In sum, the Lockean defense of religious toleration is rooted in the idea that
human beings are rational creatures. Locke argues that they must be free to use
their own minds to seek the truth that leads to salvation, and he uses this
argument to undermine the authoritarianism of the Restoration order.
These points can be clearly seen in the extended, and increasingly
acrimonious, debate that took place between Locke and his most acute critic on
toleration, the Oxford don Jonas Proast.353 In a 1690 critique of the Letter
Concerning Toleration, Proast acknowledged that individuals could be saved
by “true religion” only if they actually believed it to be true, and he also granted
“that reason and arguments are the only proper means whereby to induce the
mind to assent” to truth.354 For Proast, however, it did not follow that
individuals should be left free in matters of religion:
For if men, in choosing their religion, are . . . generally
347. LOCKE, LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 1, at 16–20, 32–33, 44–45.
348. See id. at 18–20.
349. Id. at 17–19.
350. See id. at 19.
351. Id. at 24.
352. See id. at 12, 15–16, 24, 45–48.
353. For some recent explorations of this debate, see VERNON, supra note 8; Goldie, Religious
Toleration, supra note 8.
354. JONAS PROAST, THE ARGUMENT OF THE LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, BRIEFLY
CONSIDERED AND ANSWERED (1690), in LOCKE ON TOLERATION, supra note 69, at 54–55.
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subject, . . . when left wholly to themselves, to be so much
swayed by prejudice and passion, as either not at all, or not
sufficiently to regard the reasons and motives which ought
alone to determine their choice; then it is in every man’s true
interest, not to be left wholly to himself in this matter, but that
care should be taken, that in an affair of so vast a concern to
himself, he may be brought even against his own inclination,
if it cannot be done otherwise (which is ordinarily the case) to
act according to reason and sound judgement.355
On these grounds, Proast argued that the civil magistrate must have the power
to enforce the “spiritual authority” of the Anglican clergy by requiring their
flock “to pay them reverence and due submission,” as well as by compelling
dissenters to “rethink” their views and to open their minds to consider the
teachings of the established church, where they will find the “truth which must
save them.”356
As Locke observed, however, Proast’s argument that individuals could be
forced to consider the reasons for their religious beliefs was meant to apply only
to dissenters, not to those who conformed to the established church.357 In effect,
then, dissenters were being punished for the beliefs they held and not for their
failure to consider reasons and arguments.358 Reasonable people could differ
about what beliefs were true; to impose one’s views on others amounted to an
assertion of infallibility.359 There was no basis to believe that the magistrate
was more free from passion and prejudice than his subjects, or more concerned
for the welfare of their souls.360 For these reasons, Locke concluded, I am
entitled to use “my [own] reason . . . to examine and judge” for myself in
religious matters and to care for my own soul.361 At bottom, Locke’s position
was that the authoritarian religious order that Proast defended failed to respect
individuals as rational creatures who were capable of using their minds to
pursue religious truth and salvation, and who all had an equal claim to do so.362
355. Id. at 63–64.
356. Id. at 60–63.
357. See JOHN LOCKE, A SECOND LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION (1690), in 5 THE WORKS
OF JOHN LOCKE 59, 93–97 (12th ed. 1823) [hereinafter LOCKE, SECOND LETTER CONCERNING
TOLERATION].
358. See id. at 74–75.
359. See id. at 89–91.
360. Id. at 135–36.
361. Id. at 89, 127, 132, 135–36; accord Locke, Notes on Stillingfleet, supra note 326, at 75–77,
ms. at 86.
362. See LOCKE, SECOND LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 357, at 131, 133
(maintaining that “the laws of the state [ought to be] made . . . equal to all the subjects, without
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As Locke had put the point more than two decades earlier, to compel religious
belief by force would invade “the liberty of that part where in lyes the dignity
of a man, which could it be imposd on would make him but little different from
a beast.”363
C. The Limits of Religious Liberty and Toleration
1. Religious Liberty
Although the rights of religious liberty and toleration are broad, they are
not absolute. As we have seen, the government may not mandate the religious
beliefs that individuals or churches should hold or the forms of worship they
should engage in.364 Likewise, the government would exceed its authority if it
relied on religious grounds to restrict religious belief, worship, or practice.365
On Locke’s view, however, the government may properly rely on civil
grounds to regulate the external conduct that individuals engage in, even when
they do so for religious reasons.366 The most clear-cut situation involves
conduct that itself violates the law of nature or the rights of others. Thus,
religious rituals that involve child sacrifice are no more protected than any other
kind of murder.367 Moreover, as we have seen, Locke contends that religious
liberty does not permit one to inflict “Violence [or] Injury” on others on account
of religion.368 To do so would violate their natural and civil rights to life,
liberty, and property as well as their own religious freedom.369 In this way, the
same law of nature that protects religious liberty also establishes the limits of
that liberty.
More broadly, Locke holds that while the government may not target
religious conduct as such, it may require all individuals to comply with general
laws made for the public good.370 For example, if individuals are generally
permitted to slaughter livestock, the government may not ban the sacrifice of
distinction of men of different professions in religion”). Locke was not alone in taking this position.
For example, as Richard Ashcraft has shown, during the 1670s, dissenting theologians also criticized
the Anglican religious order for failing to treat individuals as rational beings, and they developed a
theory of religion and liberty that anticipated Locke’s. See ASHCRAFT, supra note 8, at 49–69.
363. LOCKE, ESSAY CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 317, at 293–94.
364. See LOCKE, LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 1, at 33, 44–45.
365. See id. at 37–38, 48–49.
366. See id. at 37–38.
367. See id. at 37.
368. Id. at 20.
369. See id. at 20, 23.
370. See id. at 37–38.
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calves in religious ceremonies.371 By contrast, if the public interest required the
government to prohibit all slaughter of calves for a period of time in order to
rebuild the stock after a plague, religious liberty would afford believers no right
to an exemption from this ban.372
For Locke, both of these cases are governed by the same principle of
separation of religion and state. On one hand, the state may not intrude into the
religious realm by restricting conduct on religious grounds, such as the belief
that it is idolatrous.373 But on the other hand, jurisdiction over civil matters
belongs to the state, and it would undermine the integrity of the civil realm if
religious believers were entitled to demand exemption from general laws made
for the common good.374 For Locke, then, the state and religion are both
autonomous spheres that are governed by their own principles, within the larger
framework of the law of nature.
Locke maintains that, if state officials conscientiously avoid religious
considerations and direct their actions to the public good, the laws that they
make will rarely conflict with “the Conscience of a private Person.”375 If such
a case were to arise, however, Locke’s solution is that the
Person is to abstain from the Action that he judges unlawful;
and he is to undergo the Punishment, which . . . is not unlawful
for him to bear. For the private Judgment of any Person
concerning a Law enacted in Political Matters, for the publick
Good, does not take away the Obligation of that Law, nor
deserve a Dispensation.376
This position accords with Locke’s account of the social contract in the Second
Treatise, which holds that when individuals enter civil society, they give up the
unrestricted right to act on their own “private Judgment” and agree to submit to
the public judgment of the community or the government, who are entrusted
with the power to act for the good of all.377
As Locke emphasizes, however, that power is limited to civil affairs. By
contrast, for the reasons we have discussed, an individual can never give up his

371.
372.
373.
374.
375.
376.
377.

Id. at 37.
Id. at 37–38.
See id. at 38–39.
See id. at 37–38, 48.
Id. at 48.
Id.
LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra note 9, bk. II, §§ 87–89, at 323–25.
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“supreme and absolute Authority of judging for himself” in religious matters.378
Thus, just as “the private Judgment of any particular Person, if erroneous, does
not exempt him from the obligation of Law, so the private Judgment (as I may
call it) of the Magistrate does not give him any new Right of imposing Laws”
that go beyond his legitimate authority by injuring individuals on account of
religion, or by enriching or favoring one religious group at the expense of
others.379 In language that recalls his account of an “appeal to Heaven” in the
Second Treatise,380 Locke suggests that when individuals are subjected to
oppression on account of religion, they are entitled “to resist Force with Force,
and to defend their natural Rights . . . with Arms as well as they can,” while
trusting that their actions will ultimately be vindicated by “God, . . . the only
Judge in this case, who will retribute unto every one at the last day according
to his Deserts; that is, according to his sincerity and uprightness, in
endeavouring to promote Piety, and the publick Weal and Peace of
Mankind.”381
2. Religious Toleration
Locke also holds that some kinds of beliefs fall wholly outside the principle
of toleration. The first category consists of religious doctrines that “manifestly
undermine the Foundations of Society” or “those moral Rules which are
necessary to the preservation of Civil Society.”382 As he explains, examples of
these are rare, for any church that openly embraced such doctrines would
endanger its own interest and reputation. Instead, it is more common for people
“arrogate to themselves, and to those of their own Sect, some peculiar
Prerogative, covered over with a specious shew of deceitful words, but in effect
opposite to the Civil Right of the Community.”383 For example, those who
teach “that Faith is not to be kept with Hereticks” imply that they are entitled
to break agreements with those they consider unorthodox, while those who
378. See LOCKE, LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 1, at 45–46; accord id. at 13,
48; LOCKE, THIRD LETTER FOR TOLERATION, supra note 228, ch. I, at 187–88, 196–97; ch. III, at 251;
see also supra text accompanying notes 312–18. For an illuminating account of the concept of private
judgment in sixteenth and seventeenth-century radical Protestant thought, and the role that this concept
played in Locke’s theory of religious liberty, see MILLER, supra note 7, at 75–85.
379. LOCKE, LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 1, at 48–49.
380. See supra text accompanying note 210–13.
381. LOCKE, LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 1, at 60, 49; see also LOCKE,
ESSAY CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 317, at 295–96; id. at 275, n. line 19 (suggesting, in a
handwritten passage, that individuals may lawfully defend themselves against the magistrate by force
in this situation).
382. LOCKE, LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 1, at 49–50.
383. Id. at 50.
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maintain “That Dominion is founded in Grace . . . do plainly lay claim to the
possession of all things,” including governmental power.384 Those who hold
such beliefs, Locke writes, and who thus
attribute unto the Faithful, Religious and Orthodox; that is, in
plain terms, unto themselves; any peculiar Priviledge or Power
above other Mortals, in Civil Concernments; or who, upon
pretence of Religion, do challenge any manner of Authority
over such as are not associated with them in their Ecclesiastical
Communion; I say these have no right to be tolerated by the
Magistrate; as neither those that will not own and teach the
Duty of tolerating All men in matters of meer Religion. For
what do all these and the like Doctrines signifie, but that those
Men may, and are ready upon any occasion to seise the
Government, and possess themselves of the Estates and
Fortunes of their Fellow-Subjects; and that they only ask leave
to be tolerated by the Magistrate so long, until they find
themselves strong enough to effect it?385
Again, this position is best understood by reference to Locke’s broader
understanding of the law of nature. By that law, all individuals are inherently
equal.386 When they enter into the social contract, they become equal members
of the political community, which is obligated to protect the rights of all through
equal laws.387 If religious groups “arrogate to themselves” greater rights or
prerogatives than they allow to others, they violate the principles of equality
and respect which constitute “the Foundations of Society” as well as “the moral
Rules which are necessary to the preservation of Civil Society.”388 In this way,
they transgress “the first and fundamental natural Law” which mandates “the
preservation of the Society” and all of its members.389 Moreover, it is only
reasonable that those whose rights are threatened should be entitled to protect
themselves against this threat.
It may seem that, in taking this position, Locke allows the claims of civil
society to override those of religious belief. As we have seen, however, Locke
384. Id. at 50–51.
385. Id. at 51.
386. See LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra note 9, bk. II, § 4, at 269; id. bk. II, § 6, at 271.
387. See id. bk. II, § 22, at 284; bk. II, § 142, at 363.
388. LOCKE, LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 1, at 49–50. For a discussion of
the duty to respect the humanity and rights of others in Lockean thought, see Steven J. Heyman, A
Struggle for Recognition: The Controversy Over Religious Liberty, Civil Rights, and Same-Sex
Marriage, 14 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 1, 59–61 (2015).
389. LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra note 9, bk. II, § 134, at 355–56.
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holds that, as rational creatures, individuals cannot properly adopt religious
beliefs that are contrary to reason, including the principles of the law of
nature.390 Those principles are violated by beliefs that seek to subordinate
others on religious grounds. It follows that those who hold such beliefs cannot
reasonably claim that the failure to respect them violates any legitimate claim
to religious freedom.
Second, Locke would deny toleration to any church that is so constituted
“that all those who enter into it, do thereby, ipso facto, deliver themselves up to
the Protection and Service of another Prince”¾a position that would conflict
with the allegiance that they owe to their own sovereign.391 Locke offers the
example of a Muslim who is bound to follow a religious leader who himself is
wholly “obedient to the Ottoman Emperor.”392 Many contemporary readers
would have understood this illustration to be a veiled way of describing
Catholics who were obedient to the Pope, who claimed both religious and civil
authority.393 However, while this passage of the Letter is sometimes understood
to deny toleration to all Muslims and Catholics, it can also be read to allow for
the toleration of these groups so long as they separate their religious beliefs
from the political obligations that would arise from a commitment to religious
authorities who also claim political power.394 Other passages suggest that this
is Locke’s position.395
On the other hand, Locke unequivocally rejects toleration for atheists.396
Because they do not accept religion, they have no basis for a claim to religious
toleration.397 More fundamentally, he asserts that “Promises, Covenants, and
Oaths, which are the Bonds of Humane Society, can have no hold upon an
Atheist.”398 To readers today, this position may seem not only harsh but
incomprehensible, and it is also in tension with Locke’s view that laws that
390. See supra text accompanying notes 291–93.
391. LOCKE, LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 1, at 52.
392. Id.
393. See MARSHALL, EARLY ENLIGHTENMENT, supra note 8, at 690. As Marshall notes,
Locke’s statements that toleration should be denied to those who maintain that “faith is not to be kept
with heretics,” id. (quoting LOCKE, LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 1, at 50), and that
“kings excommunicated forfeit their crowns and kingdoms,” id. (quoting LOCKE, LETTER
CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 1, at 50), also would have been taken to refer to Catholics. Id.
394. See LOCKE, LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 1, at 52 n.137 (editor’s note);
MARSHALL, EARLY ENLIGHTENMENT, supra note 8, at 691–92.
395. See LOCKE, LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 1, at 58–59 (contending that
“Mahumetan[s]” are entitled to toleration).
396. See id. at 52–53.
397. Id. at 53.
398. Id. at 52–53.
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punish individuals for their beliefs are neither effective nor legitimate. On the
other hand, it is easy to see how Locke’s position accords with his fundamental
premise that morality is rooted in the duty to obey God, who establishes the law
of nature and backs it up with rewards and punishments.399
VI. REASON AND THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION
Let us pause to summarize the discussion up to this point. The Restoration
order was based on an authoritarian conception of both church and state.400 This
conception held that the Church of England was coextensive with the
commonwealth.401 As the successors of the apostles, the Anglican bishops had
God-given authority to prescribe the doctrine and discipline of the church, and
their exercise of this authority was backed by the power of the monarch, who
himself wielded absolute power over his subjects by divine right.402
To counter this view, Locke developed a radically different theory of
religion and politics. This theory was based on the proposition that God had
made human beings rational creatures with an inherent right to control their
own minds and bodies.403 The commonwealth was a society of free and equal
individuals united for the promotion of their welfare in this world, while
churches were voluntary associations that were formed to advance their
salvation in the world to come.404 It followed that neither civil nor ecclesiastical
authorities had the power to compel individuals to follow a particular
religion.405
To make this case, Locke had to show that reason was central to religious
belief. In An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, he argued for this
position on philosophical grounds,406 while in A Letter Concerning Toleration
he drew on this position to argue in favor of religious liberty.407 Yet to make
his arguments fully convincing to his contemporaries, he also needed to
demonstrate that his conception of reason was compatible with Christianity.

399.
400.
401.
402.
403.
404.
405.
406.
407.

See supra text accompanying notes 224, 234–54.
See supra Part I.
See supra text accompanying notes 39–43.
See supra Sections II.A–B.
See supra Section III.A.
See supra Parts IV–V.
See supra Section V.B.
See supra Section V.A.1.
See supra Section V.B.
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This is the task that Locke undertook in The Reasonableness of Christianity,
a work that he published in 1695,408 several years after the Essay and the Letter.
In this Part, I explore the ways in which this work sought to harmonize reason
and Christian faith, as well as the light that this effort sheds on Locke’s
approach to religious toleration.
The Reasonableness of Christianity places reason at the center of an
account of the creation and redemption of mankind. According to Locke, man
was created to be “a Rational Creature.”409 As such, he was necessarily subject
to the “Law of Reason, or as it is called, of Nature.”410 The first man, Adam,
began his existence in “the state of perfect Obedience, which is called Justice
[or Righteousness] in the New Testament.”411 The reward for this obedience
was immortality.412 Indeed, when the Scriptures say that Adam was “the Son
of God,” and that he was created in the “Image and Likeness” of God, part of
what this means is that he was immortal like his divine Father. 413
When Adam disobeyed God’s law by eating the forbidden fruit, he and all
his posterity lost this “Happy state of Immortality” and entered into “a state of
Death and Mortality.”414 In his mercy, God sent Jesus Christ to “restore[] all
mankind to Life.”415 This is the life that all shall “receive again at the
Resurrection” of the dead.416 At that time, individuals shall be judged in accord
with their own deeds, and those who are found to be righteous will be entitled
to receive “Eternal Life.”417
By itself, however, this did not provide an effective means of salvation.418
Following the New Testament writers, Locke asserts that righteousness consists
in “an exact Conformity to the Law.”419 Because all human beings have sinned,
“it follows, that no one could . . . have Eternal Life and Bliss.”420

408. See WOOLHOUSE, supra note 14, at 350.
409. LOCKE, REASONABLENESS OF CHRISTIANITY, supra note 76, ch. II, at 13.
410. Id.
411. Id. ch. I, at 6.
412. See id. ch. II, at 12; id. ch. III, at 19; id. ch. XI, at 119.
413. Id. ch. XI, at 113–15. In the First Treatise, Locke contends that being made in the image
of God means, in part, that man is “an intellectual Creature.” LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra note 9,
bk. I, § 30, at 162.
414. LOCKE, REASONABLENESS OF CHRISTIANITY, supra note 76, ch. II, at 12; id. ch. I, at 6.
415. Id. ch. II, at 11.
416. Id. ch. II, at 12.
417. Id.
418. See id. ch. II, at 14–16.
419. Id. ch. II, at 12–13.
420. Id. ch. II, at 13.
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Of course, one might ask why God gave “so hard a Law to Mankind” that
no one before Christ’s time had succeeded in keeping it.421 Locke responds that
[i]t was such a Law as the Purity of God’s Nature required, and
must be the Law of such a Creature as Man, unless God would
have made him a Rational Creature, and not required him to
have lived by the Law of Reason, but would have
countenanced in him Irregularity and Disobedience to that
Light which he had; and that Rule which was suitable to his
Nature: Which would have been, to have authorized Disorder,
Confusion, and Wickedness in his Creatures.422
Locke adds that if individuals were permitted “to forsake Reason in one point,”
there would be no logical stopping place.423 Moreover, because the dictates of
reason are the commands of God, the violation of any one of them amounts to
“direct Rebellion” against him.424 To countenance such rebellion would
undermine all “Government and Order” and leave human beings to unbounded
lawlessness.425
It was on these grounds that God required mankind to live by the law of
nature.426 In addition to being knowable through natural reason, this law was
the same as the moral part of the law that God had given to the people of Israel
through Moses.427 In the words of St. Paul, this law was “holy, just, and good,”
yet it was not sufficient to save human beings.428
For this reason, God provided a new means of salvation that the New
Testament calls “the Law of Faith.”429 According to Locke, this law did not
dispense with the moral law contained in the Old Testament: because that law
is “conformable to the Eternal Law of Right” embodied in the law of nature and
reason, it “is of Eternal Obligation, and therefore remains in force still under
the Gospel; nor is abrogated by the Law of Faith.”430 But while the law of
Moses was a “Law of Works” that could be satisfied only through “perfect

421.
422.
423.
424.
425.
426.
427.
428.
429.
430.

Id.
Id.
Id. ch. II, at 14.
Id.
Id.
See id. ch. II, at 13–14.
See id. ch. III, at 17–18.
Id. ch. II, at 14 (quoting Romans 7:12).
Id. ch. II, at 16.
Id. ch. III, at 18–19.
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Obedience,”431 God now offered a “New Covenant”432 under which those who
have faith “are admitted to Life and Immortality as if they were Righteous.”433
According to Locke, faith consists in a belief in God and in the promises he
has made to human beings.434 The crucial question, then, is “what God requires
[people] to believe[] as a condition of the [New] Covenant.”435 The bulk of The
Reasonableness of Christianity is devoted to an exploration of this question.
Locke conducts an exhaustive review of the four Gospels as well as the book
of Acts to discern what Christ and his apostles preached to be necessary for
salvation.436 Locke concludes that, in addition to believing in “one invisible,
Eternal, Omnipotent God” who is the “maker of Heaven and Earth,”437 the only
thing a person must believe is that Jesus Christ is the Messiah or King who was
sent by God to redeem mankind.438
At the same time, Locke contends that mere belief is not enough: to gain
the advantages and salvation that come from Christ’s kingdom, individuals
must become members of that kingdom through baptism and must live in
obedience to its laws.439 To be sure, Locke observes, Christ “did not
expect . . . a Perfect Obedience, void of all slips and falls: He knew our Make,
and the weakness of our Constitutions too well, and was sent with a Supply for
that Defect.”440 But his subjects were required to make “a sincere Endeavour
after Righteousness, in obeying his Law”¾a law that is “of Eternal Obligation”
because it “arise[s] from the Constitution of [Man’s] very Nature” as “a
Rational Creature.”441 Christ came into the world not to undermine this law
but, “on the contrary, to reform the corrupt state of degenerate Man; And out of
those who would mend their Lives, and bring forth Fruit meet for Repentance,
erect a new Kingdom.”442
This summary of the Reasonableness highlights some of the ways in which
Locke contends that Christianity accords with reason. First, at the core of the
work is the notion that God made human beings to be rational creatures.
431. Id. ch. III, at 17.
432. Id. ch. XI, at 111–12.
433. Id. ch. III, at 19, 22.
434. See id. ch. III, at 21–22.
435. Id. ch. III, at 22.
436. See, e.g., id. ch. IV–V, at 22–27.
437. Id. ch. III, at 22.
438. See id. ch. IV, at 22–25. Locke indicates, however, that belief that Jesus is the Messiah also
includes belief in the “concomitant Articles of his Resurrection, Rule, and coming again to Judge the
World.” Id. ch. XV, at 164; see also id. ch. V, at 25–26.
439. See id. ch. XI, at 111, 118.
440. Id. ch. XI, at 120.
441. Id. ch. XI, at 119.
442. Id.
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Second, Locke treats the law of God as essentially identical with the law of
nature and reason. Third, while Locke represents this law in highly demanding
terms, he also holds that individuals will be saved if they sincerely strive to
follow it, even though they inevitably fall short. In this way, he seeks to show
that the law is reasonable not only in an objective sense (in establishing an ideal
standard of rational human conduct), but also in a subjective sense (in
recognizing that a sincere effort to meet this standard is all that can be expected
of human beings). Fourth, like other English latitudinarians, Locke seeks to
radically simplify the essentials of Christian belief so that they do not require
one to grasp difficult metaphysical concepts such as the Trinity, but instead
consist of more straightforward assertions that even poor and uneducated
people can understand.443
In all these ways, Locke endeavors to show that the Christian doctrine on
salvation is consonant with reason. Remarkably, however, he does not insist
that Christianity provides the sole path to salvation. Toward the end of the
work, he takes up “[t]he common Objection” that if sinners are justified through
faith in Christ, what shall become of all the people who could not believe in
him because they lived before his time?444 Locke’s response is that individuals
cannot be required to believe any promises other than the ones that God has
made to them.445 In the time before Christ, God had promised the people of
Israel that he would send a “Ruler and Deliverer.”446 It follows that
[a]ll . . . that was required, before [Christ’s] appearing in the
World, was to believe what God had revealed; And to rely with
a full assurance on God for the performance of his Promise;
And to believe, that in due time he would send them the
Messiah; this anointed King; this promised Saviour, and
Deliverer, according to his Word.
This Faith in the promises [and Faithfulness] of
God; . . . [t]he Almighty takes well at our hands, as a great
mark of homage, paid by us poor frail Creatures, to his
Goodness and Truth, as well as to his Power and Wisdom; And
accepts it as an acknowledgment of his peculiar Providence,
and Benignity to us. . . . The works of Nature shew his Wisdom
and Power; But [it is] his peculiar Care of Mankind, most
443. See id. ch. XV, at 167–71. On Locke and latitudinarianism, see John C. Higgins-Biddle,
Introduction to LOCKE, REASONABLENESS OF CHRISTIANITY, supra note 76, at lxiii–lxvii, lxxiv, cxiv–
cxv; MARSHALL, RESISTANCE, supra note 8, at 57–59, 78–81, 122–25, 372–76.
444. LOCKE, REASONABLENESS OF CHRISTIANITY, supra note 76, ch. XIII, at 135.
445. See id.
446. Id.
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eminently discovered in his Promises to them, that shews his
Bounty and Goodness; And consequently engages their Hearts
in Love and Affection to him. This oblation of an Heart, fixed
with dependance on and affection to him, is the most
acceptable Tribute we can pay him; the foundation of true
Devotion; and Life of all Religion.447
This passage is noteworthy not only for the way in which it broadens the
potential for salvation beyond those who profess belief in Christ but also for the
way in which it portrays faith. In the Letter Concerning Toleration, Locke
tended to characterize faith in cognitive terms, that is, as the acceptance of
particular propositions.448 By contrast, the passage just quoted represents faith
in emotional terms as well. This serves to reinforce Locke’s argument for
toleration, for the use of coercion can no more cause individuals to incline their
hearts toward God with “Love and Affection” than it can compel them to accept
particular beliefs or doctrines.449
Locke widens his account of salvation still further when he considers the
fate of those who have never heard even the promise of a savior who is to
come.450 Once again, Locke responds that individuals cannot be required to
believe in a revelation they have never received.451 As St. Paul recognized,
those who did not belong to the people of Israel were capable of knowing the
law of nature by means of reason.452 By the same token, Locke maintains that
such individuals are capable of using reason to discover means of attaining
forgiveness for sins:
God had, by the Light of Reason, revealed to all Mankind, who
would make use of that Light, that he was Good and Merciful.
The same spark of the Divine Nature and Knowledge in Man,
which making him a Man, shewed him the Law he was under
as a Man; Shewed him also the way of Attoning the merciful,
kind, compassionate Author and Father of him and his Being,
when he had transgressed that Law. He that made use of this
Candle of the Lord, so far as to find what was his Duty; could
not miss to find also the way to Reconciliation and

447.
448.
449.
450.
451.
452.

Id. ch. XIII, at 135–36.
See supra text accompanying notes 312–29.
LOCKE, REASONABLENESS OF CHRISTIANITY, supra note 76, ch. XIII, at 136.
See id. ch. XIV, at 139.
See id.
See id. ch. III, at 17–18 (quoting Romans 2:14).

HEYMAN - MULR VOL. 101, NO. 3 (PDF).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

THE LIGHT OF NATURE

5/4/18 4:02 PM

767

Forgiveness, when he had failed of his Duty.453
In this passage, Locke goes beyond the position that we discussed earlier—
that natural religion lies at the heart of religion454—and contends that, under at
least some circumstances, natural religion may be sufficient for salvation. As
he recognized, this was a highly controversial view, for many people
understood the New Testament to hold that no one could be saved without a
belief in Jesus Christ.455
At the time Locke wrote, there were a growing number of Deists, who
rejected Christianity at least to the extent that it taught any truths that were
above reason.456 Locke’s defense of natural religion might seem to imply that
he believed that Deism was sufficient for salvation. In the Reasonableness, he
stopped short of taking this position. Instead, he asserted that none of those “to
whom the Gospel hath been Preached, shall be Saved, without believing Jesus
to be the Messiah.”457 Yet under the logic of Locke’s position, salvation does
not necessarily seem to be limited in this way. In this work, he insists that God
does not demand that individuals hold any beliefs that they cannot reasonably
be expected to adopt, while in the Essay Concerning Human Understanding
and the Letters on Toleration, he indicates that reason alone may not be
sufficient to demonstrate the truth of a revealed religion.458 It seems to follow
that God would not condemn those who were aware of the Christian message
but who reasonably found themselves unconvinced by it.459 As Locke says in
discussing faith and reason in the Essay:
453. Id. ch. XIV, at 139–40 (footnote omitted). For an earlier statement along the same lines,
see Locke, Notes on Stillingfleet, supra note 326, at 74, ms. at 75–76; cf. Locke, Of God’s Justice
(1680), in LOCKE: POLITICAL ESSAYS, supra note 71, at 277, 277–78.
454. See supra text accompanying notes 221–33.
455. See LOCKE, REASONABLENESS OF CHRISTIANITY, supra note 76, ch. XIV, at 141
(observing that Acts 4:10-12 asserts that “there is none other name under Heaven given among men,
in which we must be saved”). Indeed, this was the doctrine of the Church of England as contained in
the Thirty-Nine Articles, which condemned anyone who should “presume to say, That every man shall
be saved by the Law or Sect which he professeth, so that he be diligent to frame his life according to
that Law, and the light of Nature.” THIRTY-NINE ARTICLES, supra note 27, art. XVIII.
456. See, e.g., JOHN TOLAND, CHRISTIANITY NOT MYSTERIOUS (1696); COFFEY, supra note 18,
at 200. For some valuable discussions of Locke’s relation to Deism, see Higgins-Biddle, supra note
444, at xv–xlii; MARSHALL, RESISTANCE, supra note 8, at 407–10, 414–15, 441–42, 454.
457. LOCKE, REASONABLENESS OF CHRISTIANITY, supra note 76, ch. XII, at 134.
458. See, e.g., LOCKE, SECOND LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 357, at 88;
LOCKE, THIRD LETTER FOR TOLERATION, supra note 228, ch. I, at 143–45; id. ch. IX, at 401–02, 419–
21.
459. Cf. LOCKE, SECOND LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 357, at 75 (arguing
that individuals who remain “out of the national church” because “they are not yet convinced” are
guilty of “no fault,” and that it therefore would be unjust for the government to punish them).
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[H]e that makes use of the Light and Faculties GOD has given
him, and seeks sincerely to discover Truth, by those Helps and
Abilities he has, may have this satisfaction in doing his Duty
as a rational Creature, that though he should miss Truth, he will
not miss the Reward of it.460
That is not to say that Locke endorses Deism. On the contrary, as he later
observed, The Reasonableness of Christianity was directed at least in part
against that view.461 As we have seen, Locke holds that so long as it is regulated
by reason, revealed religion has substantial advantages over mere natural
religion, for the Gospel teaches things about the rules and the rewards of virtue
that could not discovered through natural reason alone.462 To put it another
way, Locke maintains that ideally one should be “both . . . a Deist and a
Christian”—that is, should seek out the will of God by studying “both the Law
of Nature and the Revealed Law.”463
Yet this does not lead Locke to conclude that non-Christians can never be
saved. Instead, he seems to hold that while salvation depends on faith that God
is “merciful, kind, and compassionate” and that he will pardon those who
sincerely seek his forgiveness for sins, this faith may be based on what God has
revealed through “the light of Nature” and not only through “particular
Promises.”464 In this way, he seems to open the door to salvation for Deists as
well as for the adherents of non-Christian religions, to the extent that those
individuals follow the precepts of natural religion.
In short, while Locke may believe that a rational form of Christianity has
advantages over other forms of belief, he appears to recognize that there are
other paths to salvation.465 This position, which is consistent with his stress on
the centrality of reason in the relationship between human beings and God,
provides additional support for a principle of religious toleration. That
principle is further reinforced by Locke’s effort in the Reasonableness to
simplify the Christian faith—an effort that not only makes the faith more
460. LOCKE, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 12, bk. IV, ch. XVII, § 24, at 688; accord
John Locke, Error (1698), in LOCKE: POLITICAL ESSAYS, supra note 71, at 345, 345–46.
461. See JOHN LOCKE, A SECOND VINDICATION OF THE REASONABLENESS OF CHRISTIANITY
(1697) [hereinafter LOCKE, SECOND VINDICATION ], in VINDICATIONS OF THE REASONABLENESS OF
CHRISTIANITY 27, 36, 71, 101, 191 (Victor Nuovo ed., Clarendon Press 2012).
462. See supra text accompanying notes 258–72.
463. LOCKE, SECOND VINDICATION, supra note 461, at 71.
464. LOCKE, REASONABLENESS OF CHRISTIANITY, supra note 76, ch. XIII, at 137–39; id. ch.
XIV, at 139–41.
465. Alternatively, if one reads the Reasonableness to preclude this, the most plausible
conclusion is that Locke is speaking there purely as a Christian theologian rather than a philosopher.
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accessible to all individuals, including the poor and uneducated, but that also
highlights the fundamental beliefs that all Christians hold in common rather
than the points on which they disagree.466
VII. CONCLUSION: LOCKE’S LEGACY FOR AMERICA
In works like A Letter Concerning Toleration and Two Treatises of
Government, Locke sought to transform the traditional Western view of religion
and politics as it was embodied in Restoration England. That view regarded
church and state as interdependent institutions that were empowered by God to
direct the spiritual and temporal lives of individuals and that were entitled to
unquestioning obedience.
In challenging this authoritarian position, Locke proposed a radically
different starting point, which held that individuals were rational creatures who
were naturally free to direct their own thoughts and actions. The state was a
society of rational creatures who had voluntarily joined together to protect their
civil interests. Reason and freedom were also central to the religious sphere.
As rational creatures, individuals had an inherent and inalienable liberty to form
their own beliefs and to worship God in a manner they believed to be acceptable
to him. Neither the government nor private parties had any right to injure others
on account of religion, to deprive them of their civil rights, or to coerce them to
conform to a particular church. Instead, churches were free and voluntary
associations that individuals entered in the hope of attaining salvation. On this
view, church and state did not form a unified and divinely ordained religious
and political order but rather were separate and distinct institutions that were
founded upon the consent of their members. In these ways, Locke sought to
liberate individuals from “Tyranny in the Commonwealth”467 as well as “from
all Dominion over one another in matters of Religion.”468
Although Locke’s writings on religion and toleration were influential in
late-seventeenth- and eighteenth-century England,469 that nation stopped short
of granting the broad toleration that he advocated, let alone establishing a
separation of church and state.470 Similarly, Locke’s political theory was too

466. See LOCKE, REASONABLENESS OF CHRISTIANITY, supra note 76, ch. XV, at 169–71;
Higgins-Biddle, supra note 444, at cxiv–cxv. In the Letter, Locke highlights the connection between
this approach and religious toleration. See LOCKE, LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 1,
at 7–10, 16–18, 27–28, 64–67.
467. LOCKE, LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 1, at 61.
468. Id. at 32.
469. See SELL, supra note 8, at 2–3.
470. See COFFEY, supra note 18, at 198–206.
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radical to achieve full acceptance in his own country. By contrast, his views
had a much deeper impact in the New World.
Of course, this is not the place to fully explore the reception of Locke’s
views in America or to trace the ways in which the new republics followed,
expanded upon, and deviated from them. Instead, I wish to conclude with a
brief look at a few classic documents that reflect the themes discussed in this
Article, and that make clear the profound role that Locke’s thought played in
laying the foundations for the American political order in general and its
protections for religious liberty in particular.
First, consider the Declaration of Independence, which sets forth a
justification for the American Revolution that accords with Lockean concepts
of natural rights, natural law, and natural religion.471 After opening with an
invocation of “the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God,” the Declaration asserts
that he has created all human beings equal and has endowed them with
“unalienable Rights” to “Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness”;472 that
individuals consent to establish government for the protection of these rights;473
and that when the government abuses its power, the people have a right to
revolution.474 The document then enumerates the ways that King George III
had abused his power and become a “Tyrant.”475 The signers conclude by
“appealing to the Supreme Judge of the world for the rectitude of our
intentions” and by declaring their polities to be free and independent states that
are absolved of all allegiance to the British crown.476 In this way, the
Declaration launches the new American political order on Lockean
principles.477 Those principles also form the basis for the first state bills of
rights, such as the Virginia Declaration that I discussed in the Introduction.478
Lockean views also lie at the heart of some leading American defenses of
religious liberty, including the Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom that

471. DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (1776), reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION,
supra
note
2,
Bill
of
Rights,
doc.
3,
at
4,
http://presspubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch1s5.html [https://perma.cc/89YQ-EWTD].
472. Id.
473. Id.
474. Id.
475. Id. at 5.
476. Id.
477. See CARL BECKER, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: A STUDY IN THE HISTORY OF
POLITICAL IDEAS ch. II (1922); ZUCKERT, NATURAL RIGHTS REPUBLIC, supra note 7, at 16.
478. See supra text accompanying notes 2–5.
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Thomas Jefferson drafted in 1779.479 The bill’s preamble recites many of the
Lockean positions that we have seen in this Article:
• “[T]hat Almighty God hath created the mind free,
and . . . ma[de] it altogether insusceptible of restraint”;480
• “[T]hat the opinions and belief of men depend not on their
own will, but follow involuntarily the evidence proposed
to their minds”;481
• That “the holy author of our religion” has “chose[n] not to
propagate it by coercions on either [mind or body], . . . but
to extend it by its influence on reason alone”;482
• That civil and ecclesiastical rulers are “but fallible and
uninspired men,” whose efforts to “assume[] dominion
over the faith of others, . . . hath established and
maintained false religions over the greatest part of the
world, and through all time”;483
• “That our civil rights have no dependance on our religious
opinions, any more than on our opinions in physicks or
geometry”;484
• “That the opinions of men are not the object of civil
government, nor under its jurisdiction”;485
• “And finally, that truth is great and will prevail if left to
herself; that she is the proper and sufficient antagonist to
errour, and has nothing to fear from the conflict, unless by
human interposition, disarmed of her natural weapons, free
argument and debate; errours ceasing to be dangerous
when it is permitted freely to [contradict] them.”486
For these and other reasons, the bill then provided
that no man shall be compelled to frequent or support any
relig[i]ous Worship place or Ministry whatsoever, nor shall be
enforced, restrained, molested, or burthened in his body or
479. See THOMAS JEFFERSON, A BILL FOR ESTABLISHING RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (1779),
reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, amend. I, doc. 37, at 77, http://presspubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/amendI_religions37.html
[https://perma.cc/8QMJ-QP7V].
For a discussion of Jefferson’s reliance on Locke’s writings on toleration, see DAVID N. MAYER, THE
CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 158–60 (1994).
480. JEFFERSON, supra note 479, at 77.
481. Id.
482. Id.
483. Id.
484. Id.
485. Id.
486. Id.

HEYMAN - MULR VOL. 101, NO. 3 (PDF).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

772

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

5/4/18 4:02 PM

[101:705

goods, nor shall otherwise suffer on account of his religious
opinions or belief, but that all men shall be free to profess, and
by argument to maintain their opinions in matters of religion,
and that the same shall in no wise diminish, enlarge, or affect
their civil capacities.487
The bill concluded by declaring “that the rights hereby asserted are of the
natural rights of mankind, and that if any act shall be hereafter passed to repeal
the present [bill], or to narrow its operation, such act will be an infringement of
natural right.”488
In 1786, the Virginia General Assembly enacted a revised version of
Jefferson’s bill after defeating a proposal to impose a tax for the support of
religious ministry.489 The controversy over that proposal also produced another
classic defense of religious liberty, James Madison’s Memorial and
Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments.490
Like Jefferson’s bill, Madison’s Memorial is steeped in a Lockean view of
religion and liberty of conscience.491 After quoting the Virginia Declaration’s
assertion “[t]hat Religion . . . can be directed only by reason and conviction, not
by force or violence,” the Memorial contends that the free exercise of religion
“is in its nature an unalienable right” for two reasons:
(1) “because the opinions of men, depending only on the evidence contemplated
by their own minds cannot follow the dictates of other men,” and (2) “because
what is here a right towards men, is a duty towards the Creator.”492 It follows
“that in matters of Religion, no mans right is abridged by the institution of Civil
Society and that Religion is wholly exempt from its cognizance.”493 The
Memorial also maintains that those who claim religious liberty for themselves
must be willing to allow “an equal freedom to [others]”;494 that establishments
487. Id. (alteration in original).
488. Id.
489. VIRGINIA, ACT FOR ESTABLISHING RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (1785), reprinted in 5 THE
FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, amend. I, doc. 44, at 84, http://presspubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/amendI_religions44.html
[https://perma.cc/7D6E-4N38].
Jefferson’s Act was signed into law in January 1786. See BANNING, supra note 4, at 97. For an account
of the pitched political and legislative battle over the religious assessments bill, see id. at 88–97.
490. JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS
(1785), reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, amend. I, doc. 43, at 82–83,
http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/amendI_religions43.html
[https://perma.cc/6MD5-WLUH].
491. See BANNING, supra note 4, at 91–93.
492. MADISON, supra note 490, § 1, at 82 (quoting VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, supra note
2, art. 16, at 3–4).
493. Id.
494. Id. § 4, at 82.
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of religion improperly assume “either that the Civil Magistrate is a competent
Judge of Religious Truth; or that he may employ Religion as an engine of Civil
policy”;495 that far from being necessary for the support of either religion or
civil government, such establishments tend to corrupt religion, to promote
“spiritual” and “political tyranny,” and to endanger “the liberties of the
people”;496 and finally that the use of state power to impose religious uniformity
tends to induce struggles for power between sects, to undermine “‘Christian
forbearance, love and charity,’” and to provoke disobedience to the
government.497
Finally, while there is a substantial debate about the original meaning of the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment,498 it seems beyond dispute that
the Free Exercise Clause was meant to protect religious liberty understood as
an inalienable right of individuals. In his speech introducing the Bill of Rights
in the First Congress, Madison discussed the rights protected by the state
declarations and contended that those rights should also be protected at the
federal level.499 He observed that those rights included the “natural right[s]” of
individuals, or “those rights which are retained when particular powers are
given up to be exercised by the Legislature.”500 As we have seen, the state
declarations described the right to religious liberty in these terms.501 The same
natural rights view can be found in discussions of religious freedom during the
debates over ratification of the Federal Constitution,502 as well as in the
495. Id. § 5, at 83.
496. Id. §§ 6–8, 15, at 83–84.
497. Id. §§ 11, 13, at 83, 84 (quoting VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, supra note 2, art. 16, at 4).
498. Compare, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 11–14 (1947) (Black, J.) (maintaining
that the Establishment Clause was intended to reflect the same principles as Jefferson’s Act for
Establishing Religious Freedom in Virginia), with Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 541 U.S.
1, 49–50 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) (contending that the clause is simply “a
federalism provision intended to prevent Congress from interfering with state establishments” of
religion, not a protection for individual religious liberty).
499. For Madison’s speech, see HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION, reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, Bill of Rights, doc. 11,
at
20–40,
http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/bill_of_rightss11.html
[https://perma.cc/XF22-BW2L].
500. Id. at 26.
501. See supra text accompanying notes 4–5. The state provisions are collected (together with
colonial and related provisions) in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS § 1.1.3, at 13–52 (Neil H. Cogan
ed., 1997).
502. See, e.g., CENTINEL, No. 2 (1787), in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 501,
§ 1.2.4.5, at 74 (criticizing the proposed Constitution because it lacks a “declaration, that all men have
a natural and unalienable right to worship Almighty God, according to the dictates of their own
consciences and understanding”); AN OLD WHIG, No. 5 (1787), in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS,
supra note 501 § 1.2.4.7, at 75–76 (describing “LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE” as a “natural
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constitutional amendments that were proposed by the state ratifying
conventions.503 In these ways, the Free Exercise Clause clearly was rooted in
the vision of human liberty that Locke had articulated a century earlier.

right[] . . . which it is of the utmost importance for the people to retain to themselves, which indeed
they have not even the right to surrender, and which at the same time it is of no kind of advantages to
government to strip them of”).
503. For example, the New York convention urged an amendment to declare “[t]hat the People
have an equal, natural and unalienable right, freely and peaceably to Exercise their Religion according
to the dictates of Conscience, and that no Religious Sect or Society ought to be favored or established
by Law in preference of others.” New York Proposal (1788), in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS,
supra note 501, § 1.1.2.4, at 12. For other state proposals, see THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra
note 501, § 1.1.2, at 11–13.

